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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
Robert Harold Boaz, : Case No. 940245-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
INTRODUCTION 
As explained in the attached "Motion, Stipulation and Order 
to File Supplemental Brief and to Suspend Technical Compliance with 
Briefing Requirements", Mr. Robert Harold Boaz, appearing in propria 
persona, files the following supplemental brief which challenges the 
jurisdiction of this Court and the court below. The nature of the 
jurisdictional issues are summarized in the attached Motion and 
elaborated upon in the "brief" entitled, "Memorandum of Law" and 
"Addendum to Memorandum of Law". A copy of the transcribed argument 
in which Mr. Boaz contested the inadequacy of the court hearing on 
jurisdiction is also attached. 
MOTION, STIPULATION AND ORDER 
TO FILE SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF AND TO 
SUSPEND TECHNICAL COMPLIANCE WITH 
BRIEFING REQUIREMENTS 
ORIGINAL 
RONALD S. FUJINO (USB #53 87) 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-5444 
FILED 
Utah Court of ApDeafs 
FEB 0 6 1925 
Marilyn M. Branch 
Clerk of the Court 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
Robert Harold Boaz, 
De f endant/Appe11ant 
MOTION, STIPULATION AND 
ORDER TO FILE SUPPLEMENTAL 
BRIEF AND TO SUSPEND 
TECHNICAL COMPLIANCE WITH 
BRIEFING REQUIREMENTS 
Case No. 940245-CA 
Priority No. 2 
COMES NOW Defendant/Appellant, Robert Harold Boaz, in 
propria persona, and hereby requests permission to file a 
supplemental brief which may lack technical compliance with the 
rules of appellate procedure. See Black's Law Dictionary 712 (5th 
ed. 1979) (In propria persona "was formerly a rule in pleading that 
pleas to the jurisdiction of the court must be plead in propria 
persona, because if pleaded by attorney they admit the 
jurisdiction, . . .tf) . A brief background is in order. 
On February 11, 1994, Mr. Robert Boaz entered a conditional 
guilty plea to "Fraudulent Offer or Sale of Securities", see Utah 
Code Ann. § 61-1-1; "Offer or Sale of Unregistered Securities", see 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-7; and "Offer or Sale of Securities by an 
Unregistered Agent." See Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-3(1) . (R 461-70) . 
As part of Mr. Boaz's plea agreement, "the state and the Court agree 
that defendant does not waive his right to appeal the denial of the 
Motion to Dismiss filed for Lack of Jurisdiction, and accompanying 
documents and arguments in support thereof, but rather enters his 
pleas conditionally preserving that right of appeal . . . " (R 461). 
The jurisdictional motions were personally and individually 
advanced by Mr. Robert Boaz during the lower court proceedings. 
See, e.g. , (R 201-296) . As appointed counsel for Mr. Boaz 
explained, Mr. Boaz "is going to be in charge of . . .
 # in control 
of the [jurisdictional] motion that he has filed with the Court." 
(R 545) . For nonjurisdictional issues, appointed counsel would 
otherwise represent Mr. Boaz. (R 545). In a manner consistent with 
the division of issues below, Mr. Boaz's docketing statement noted 
that Mr. Boaz would personally appeal his jurisdictional issues and 
counsel for Mr. Boaz would appeal his nonjurisdictional issue. 
Accordingly, Mr. Boaz formally moves this Court for 
permission to individually file a supplemental brief on his 
jurisdictional issues. He further requests a suspension of the 
technical filing requirements for briefs. See Utah R. App. P. 24. 
An example of the briefed arguments are attached and may be 
summarized as follows. Mr. Robert Boaz, appearing in propria 
persona, takes issue with the inadequate hearing allowed for his 
jurisdictional arguments. (R 544) . In addition, his jurisdictional 
arguments essentially fall under three areas: 
[Mr. Boaz:] The first is because of my status as a 
sovereign, natural born state citizen of the Texas 
Republic, and not a United States citizen, the court 
of jurisdiction, the proper court of jurisdiction in 
this matter, according to the U.S. Constitution is the 
U.S. Supreme Court. 
Secondly, if this court has jurisdiction, it leaves 
me without remedy because as a sovereign citizen I 
cannot be compelled to accept a benefit from the 
government that I do not desire; and should I be 
damaged in this action, I am without remedy to be able 
to collect damages since the government has taken 
constitutional money out of circulation and I do not 
wish to accept the benefit of using Federal Reserve 
Notes to collect the damage should I be awarded one 
because I do not wish to get involved in the 
discharging of debts rather than paying them. 
And thirdly, the Court lacks jurisdiction because 
of its lack of ability to enforce its judgments. 
According to your Utah code, you can fine me up to 
$10,000 per count in the event of a conviction. Well, 
I am unable to pay that since there is no 
constitutional money in circulation and, once again, I 
cannot be compelled to use Federal Reserve Notes to 
discharge a debt with limited liability instad of 
paying a debt. And that really is what the three main 
points are, the three points are, and it all turns on 
my status. 
Now, I have filed an affidavit with the Court of 
status and another affidavit of recession which is on 
record in [Tarrant] County, Texas, and it is the 
state's position that some contracts between me and 
the federal government or any other level or 
government exists, I demand it be brought in the 
courtroom, entered into evidence so I can examine it 
and rebut it. 
(R 548-49). 
The trial court called Mr. Boaz's arguments a 
"constitutionalist defense", (R 555), and rejected his position. 
(R 457). Mr. Boaz's jurisdictional pre-trial pleadings, which 
consisted of over one-hundred pages, have since been shortened for 
appeal. Compare (R 201-296; 319-345), with Attachments. Out of 
deference to Mr. Boaz's position and in an effort to avoid 
misstating the arguments, appointed counsel for Mr. Robert Boaz 
respectfully requests that the jurisdictional arguments be filed by 
Mr. Boaz himself in a supplemental brief and in a manner similar to 
the documents heretofore attached.1 Mr. Boaz also may later file a 
related "brief" which addresses the inadequacy of the jurisdictional 
hearing. 
For nonjurisdictional issues argued on appeal, appointed 
counsel for Mr. Boaz will brief such arguments in accordance with 
the applicable rules. See Utah R. App. P. 24. The scheduled due 
date for the opening brief is February 18, 1995. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this k day of February, 1995. 
lobJrt Harolc 
fo^ 
Robe d Boaz 
Sui Juris, In Propria Persona 
d£d 
RONALD S. FUJINO 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
1. In McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984), a case 
centering around the role of standby counsel, the supreme court 
reaffirmed the defendant's right to self representation and noted, 
"The pro se defendant must be allowed to control the organization 
and content of his own defense, to make motions, to argue points of 
law, to participate in voir dire, to question witnesses, and to 
address the court and the jury at appropriate points in the trial." 
Id. at 174; see also id. at 177 ("the primary focus must be on 
whether the defendant had a fair chance to present his case in his 
own way"). The principle underlying McKaskle would apply 
analogously here to the filing of a supplemental brief even though 
Mr. Boaz has indicated, "I am not here acting as my own attorney. 
am here in propria persona [.] " (R 547-48) . The individual and 
personal manner in which Mr. Boaz has presented his jurisdictional 
issues has been consistent through out the proceedings. 
STIPULATION 
I, Christine F. Soltis, Assistant Attorney General, have 
read the foregoing Motion and stipulate herein on the condition that 
the jurisdictional issues be submitted on the merits and without 
oral argument unless this Court decides otherwise. 
DATED this (,p day of February, 1995. 
FILED l Am^^ CHRISTINE F. SOLflS 
___ , . Assistant Attorney General 
FEB 1M 1995 0»^A.&M.6k. COURTJOFAPPEALS O R D ^ 
Based upon Appellant's motion, the State's stipulation, and 
for good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant's "Motion, Stipulation, 
and Order to File Supplemental Brief and to Suspend Technical 
Compliance with Briefing Requirements" be granted. Mr. Boaz's 
supplemental brief on his jurisdictional issues may be filed in a 
form similar to the ones attached with this motion. Counsel for 
Mr. Boaz shall file an opening brief on the nonjurisdictional issue 
in a manner which complies with the rules of appellate procedure. 
DATED this | ' day of February, 1995. 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW 
AND 
ADDENDUM TO MEMORANDUM OF LAW 
Robert Harold Boaz, Sui Juris, In Propria Persona 
Defendant/Appellant, 
c/o 424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-5444 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, MEMORANDUM OF LAW 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. Case No.940245-ca 
Robert Harold Boaz, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW 
CLASSES OF CITIZENSHIP 
1. The Constitution of the United States of America recognizes several classes of people 
who exist in this Union of States, as described in Article 1, Section 2, Clause 3 (1:2:3). 
2. This Court is herewith mandated to take judicial notice of the Constitution of the United 
States of America, the Constitution of the Utah Republic, the Statutes at Large of the United States 
of America, and all case law presented herein, pursuant to the Federal Rules of Evidence, Section 
201, etseq., and Article 4, Section 1 (4:1) of the Constitution of the United States of America (1787). 
3. Excluding "Indians not taxed", since they are not under consideration in this matter, we 
are left with two other classes of individuals defined in 1:2:3 of the U.S. Constitution, to wit: "free 
Persons" and "three-fifths of all other Persons". 
4. The term "three fifths of all other Persons" referred to the Black slave population and all 
others of races other than "white" who could not and did not have Common-Law Citizenship of one 
of the several States, at the time the Constitution was adopted. (For an in-depth analysis of this fact, 
see the cases of Dred Scott vs Sanford, 19 How. 393; U.S. vs Rhodes, 1 Abbott 39; Slaughter 
House Cases, 16 Wall. 74; Van Valkenburq vs Brown, 43 Cal. 43; U.S. vs Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 
649; and K. Tashiro vs Jordan, 201 Cal. 239; etal.) 
5. The Thirteenth Amendment, officially and lawfully ratified in 1865, served only to 
abolish slavery within the corporate United States. No race other than the white race could claim 
Common-Law Citizenship of one of the several States, which Citizenship was afforded the 
protection of the Constitutions. (This is discussed in depth in Dred Scott vs Sanford, supra). 
6. Following the decision in Dred Scott, supra, Congress allegedly enacted and ratified 
the so-called 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America to afford "statutory 
citizenship" status to those who were deemed excluded from this Common-Law status under the 
Supreme Court's interpretations of the Constitution. This event unfolds in detail in the case law 
surrounding the 13th and 14th Amendments, with a very significant difference which is of great 
importance to the instant matter. 
7. Such cases as the Slaughter House Cases, supra; Twining vs New Jersey, 211 U.S. 
78; K. Tashiro vs Jordan, supra; among many others, all declared that under the Law, "there is a 
clear distinction between a Citizen of a State and a citizen of the United States". 
8. A famous French statesman, Fredrick Bastiat, noted in the early 1800's that if 
freedom were to be destroyed in America, it would result from the question of 
slavery and from the failure to equate all races and all humans as "equals". The 
Accused is not responsible for the errors of the past and elects not to dwell at length on this subject. 
However, the so-called 14th Amendment must now be discussed and, as abhorrent as it may 
sound, it is a matter of fact and law that this is the position (intentional or unintentional) which forms 
the basis of the law with which we live today. 
9. In brief, as a result of the 13th Amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that the 
Union of States known as the United States of America was founded by "white" people and for 
"white" people, and only "white" people could enjoy the Rights, Privileges and Immunities afforded 
and protected by the Federal and State Constitutions. This fact is most eloquently set forth in Dred 
Scott vs Sanford, supra, in stating that"... if a black nation were to adopt our Constitution verbatim, 
they would have the absolute right to restrict the right of citizenship only to the black population if 
they chose to do so ...." 
10. To overcome the decision in Dred Scott, supra, the so-called 14th Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States of America was allegedly ratified "at the point of a bayonet", and 
was "declared" to be a part of the Constitution in the year 1868. However, an examination of the 
ratification by the several States shows that various improper proceedings occurred which, in effect, 
nullify the Amendment. "I cannot believe that any court, in full possession of its faculties, could 
honestly hold that the amendment was properly approved and adopted." SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH State vs Phillips. 540 P.2d. 936 (1975); see also Dvett vs Turner, 439 P.2d. 
266 (1968). 
11. Accused Common-Law Citizen ROBERT HAROLD BOAZ] will not digress into an in-
depth dissertation of the bogus ratification of the so-called 14th Amendment, because the only 
necessary point to be made is that the so-called 14th Amendment had a profound effect upon the 
Union of these United States, and this effect continues to the present time. 
12. The Original Constitution of the United States of America (1787) refers to Common-
Law Citizens of the several States in the Preamble, in Article 4, Section 2, Clause 1 (4:2:1), and in 
numerous other sections. Always, the word Citizen is spelled with a capital "C" when referring to 
this class of Common-Law Citizen as a "Citizen of the United States", i.e., as a "Citizen of one of the 
United States". 
13. In contrast, the so-called 14th Amendment utilizes a small "c" to distinguish this class 
of citizens whose status makes them "subject to the jurisdiction thereof" as a statutory "citizen of the 
United States". 
14. In the law, each word and each use of the word, including its capitalization or the lack 
of capitalization, has a distinctive legal meaning. In this case, there never was the specific status of 
a "citizen of the United States" until the advent of the 1866 Civil Rights Act (14 Stat. 27) which was 
the forerunner of the ^ ^ ....or.ar — ,See Ex Parte Knowies, 5 Onl IJi H i 11 In 'tiniln m 
of the "United States" is d^ - **••' ^ thp np tion of this memorandum ) 
15 Befor e me su-uaneu i*+m Amendment was declared to be a part of the I I.S. 
Constitution, there were a number of State "residents" who could not enjoy "Common-Law 
Citizenship" in one of the several States under that Constitution, because they were not "white". 
The effect of the so-called 14th Amendment was to give to all those residents a citizenship in the 
nation-state that was created by Congress in the year 1801 and named the "United States" (see 2 
Stat. 103; see also U.S. vs Eliason, 41 U.S. 291, 16 Peter 291, 10 LEd. 968.) The original Civil 
Rights Act of 1866 was not encompassing enough, so it was expanded in the year 1964; but the 
legal effect was the same, namely, to grant to "citizens of the United States" the equivalent rights of 
the Common-Law white Citizens of the several States. In reality, however, those "equivalent rights" 
are limited by various statutes, codes and regulations and can be changed at the whim of Congress. 
-Ig under
 t h e pec jera i a n ( j state Constitutions, "... We the People" did not surrender our 
individual sovereignty to either the State or Federal Government. Powers "delegated" do not 
equate to powers surrendered. This is a Republic, not a democracy, and the majority cannot 
impose its will upon the minority simply because some "law" is already set forth. Any individual can 
do anything he or she wishes to do, so long as it does not damage, injure or impair the same Right 
of another individual. The concept of a corpus delicti is relevant here, in order to prove some 
"crime" or civil damage. 
17. 1he case law surrounding the 13th and I .... .....«..j::.e:Uw - vith the same 
message: "These amendments did not change the status of Common-Law -^  ip of the white 
Citizens of one of the several States of the Union" (now 50 in number). 
18. " I his goes to the cr ux of tl te controversy because, under the so-called i 
i endment, citizenship is a privilege and not a "Right" (See American and Ocean Ins. s 
Canter, 1 Pet 511; Cook vs Tai l 265 U.S 47 (1924)). 
19., It was never the intent of the so-called 14th Amendment to change the status of tl le 
Common-Law Citizens of the several States. (See People vs Washington, 36 C. 658, 661 (1869); 
French vs Barber, 181 U.S. 324; MacKenzie vs Hare, 60 ! Ed 297). 
20. \ towever, over the years, the so-called 14th Amei idment has beei i used to create a 
fiction and to destroy American freedom through administrative regulation. How is this possible? 
The answer is self-evident to anyone who understands the law, namely, a "privilege" is regulatable 
to any degree including the alteration and even the revocation of that privilege. 
Since the statutory status of "citizen of the United States, subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof" (1866 Civil Rights Act) is one of privilege and not of Right, and since the so-called 14th 
Amendment mandates that both Congress and the several States take measures to protect these 
new "subjects", then both the Federal and State governments are mandated to protect the privileges 
and immunities of ONLY these "citizens of the United States" (See Hale vs Henkel. 201 U.S. 43). 
22. Of course, the amount of protection afforded has a price to pay, but the important fact is 
that the "privilege" of citizenship under the so-called 14th Amendment can be regulated or revoked 
because it is a "privilege" and not a RIGHT. It is here that the basic, fundamental concept of "self-
government" tl irns into a Kinn "nnverninn his subjects". 
23. One can be i . but that was a title of nobility granted by the King II i 
l^ o
 rea||y f ree encompasset ^ _« v, ~e than grants of titles and privileges. 
24. Over the years since " > 7 , because our forefatners would have rather fought than bow 
to involuntary servitude, the "powers tha* b r ~ slowly and carefully used the so-called 14th 
Amendment and the Social Security Act to force primary State Citizenship into relative extinction, in 
the eyes of the courts. Nevertheless, this class of Common-Law Citizens is not extinct yet; it is 
simply being ignored, in order to maintain and enlarge a revenue base for Congress. 
25. Since the State of Utah has been mandated by the 14th Amendment to protect the 
statutory "citizens of the United States", and since the People in general have been falsely led to 
obtain "Social Security Numbers" as "U.S. citizens", the States, under prompting by the Federal 
Government have used the licensing and registration of vehicles and people under the "equal 
protection" clause for the "Public Welfare" to perpetuate a scheme of revenue enhancement and 
regulation. This scheme has been implemented, in part, by promoting the fiction that the Common-
Law "Citizens of a State of the Union of several States" can be regulated to the same degree as 
statutory "citizens of the United States". 
26. I, Robert Harold Boaz, contend that both the State of Utah and the Federal 
Government (known as the "United States") are committing an act of GENOCIDE upon the 
Common-Law State Citizens of the several States by perpetrating and perpetuating the "fiction of 
law" that everyone is a statutory "citizen of the United States". 
This allegation is now discussed by proving exactly what the "United States" means and in 
what capacity it now operates. 
WHAT IS THE "UNITED STATES"? 
27. As we begin, it must be noted that this Common-Law Citizen alleges "fraud" by the 
State and Federal Governments in their failure to inform the people that they are all included 
(through the use of a fiction of law) in that statutory class of persons called "citizens of the United 
States". 
28. The use of this fiction of law is particularly abhorrent in view of the fact that, when 
arbitrarily applied to everyone, the States lose their sovereignty, the Common-Law Citizens of the 
State lose their fundamental rights, and the "citizens of the United States" lose the guidelines which 
established their "civil rights". The net effect is that these actions have lowered everyone's status to 
that of a "subject". 
29. There is a clear distinction between the meanings of "United States" and "United 
States of America". The people of America have been fraudulently and purposely misled to believe 
that these terms are completely synonymous in every context. 
30. In fact, in Law the term "United States of America" refers to the several States which 
are "united by and under the Constitution"; the term "United States" refers to that geographical area 
defined in Article 1, Section 8, Clause 17 (1:8:17) and in Article 4, Section 3, Clause 2 (4:3:2) of the 
Federal Constitution. 
31. In 1802, the "Congress Assembled" incorporated a geographical area known as the 
"United States". The "United States" is, therefore, a nation-state which is separate and unique unto 
itself. Furthermore, even though the "United States" is not a member of the "Union of States united 
by and under the Constitution", it is bound by that Constitution to restrict its activities in dealing with 
the several States and with the Common-Law Citizens of those States. Under 1:8:17 and 4:3:2 of 
the Constitution of the United States of America (1787), Congress has exclusive power to legislate 
and regulate the inhabitants of its geographical territory and its statutory "citizens" under the 
so-called 14th Amendment, wherever they are "resident", even if they do inhabit one of the 50 
States of the Union. 
32. The term "United States" has always referred to the "Congress Assetiibled", or to those 
geographical areas defined in 1:8:17 and 4:3:2 in the U.S. Constitution. The proof of this fact is 
found in the Articles of Confederation. 
ARTICl ESOFC ONFEDER A I [ Dl J . , • . .• . • -: 
Whereas the Delegates of the United States of America in Congress Assembled did on the 
fifteenth day of November in the year of our Lord One Thousand Seven Hundred and 
Seventy Seven, and in the Second Year of the Independence of America agree to certain 
Articles of Confederation and perpetual union between the States of 
* iri! 1 Hi II I II I h i j I II! Il  III! • i I f M l e i J I y ..I! i l l II "'  Il Il • I Hi it - Il Stat ; a • Il n 11 it;a"\ • ' 
ARTICLE 111 Each State retains its sovereignty, fin s s :::l ::: i i i ai id independence, and even y 
power, jurisdiction and right, which is not by this confederation expressly delegated tc I e 
United States, in Congress Assembled. 
N Q T E .
 T h e t e r m "UNITED STATES" as used therein refers expressly to "Congress 
Assembled" on behalf of the several States which comprise the Union of States (now 50 in number). 
33 '> s ::::an readily be seen from the quote below, with three separate and distinct 
definitions for the term "United States", it becomes absolutely necessary to separate and define 
each use of this term in law. It is equally as necessary to separate and define to whom the law 
applies when there are two classes of citizenship existing side-by-side, with separate and distinct 
rights, privileges and immunities for each. Such a separate distinction is not made in the Internal 
Revenue Code. Citizens of the Texas or Utah Republics are nowhere defined in this Code or in its 
regulations, but are expressly omitted as such and identified indirectly at best (see 26 U.S.C. 
7701(b)(1)(B)). 
The term "United states" may be used in any one of several senses. It may be merely the 
name of a sovereign occupying the position analogous to that of other sovereigns in a family 
of nations. It may designate territory over which sovereignty of the United States 
extends, or it may be the collective name of the States which are united by and t mder the 
Constitution. 
fHooven & Allison Co. vs Evatt. 324 U.S. 652 (1945)] 
[65 S.Ct. 870, 880, 89 L.Ed. 1252] 
[emphasis added] 
34. 1he term "United states", when used in its territorial meaning, encompasses the areas 
of land defined in 1:8:17 and 4:3:2, nothing more. In this respect, the "United States" is a separate 
Nation which is foreign with respect to the States united by and under the Constitution, because the 
"United States" as such has never applied for admission to the Union of States 
known as the "United States of America". Accordingly, statutory "citizens of the United 
States", who are "subject to the jurisdiction thereof", are defined in the wording of the so-called 14th 
Amendment and of The Civil Rights Acts. At best, this so-called Amendment is a "private Act", rather 
than a public act, which designates a class of people who are unique to the territorial jurisdiction of 
the District of Columbia, the Federal Territories and Possessions, and the land which has been 
ceded by the Legislatures of the 50 States to the foreign nation-state of the "United States" for forts, 
magazines, arsenals and "other needful buildings" (see 1:8:17 and 4:3:2). Collectively, this 
territorial jurisdiction is now termed "The Federal Zone" to distinguish it uniquely from the nation as 
a whole and from the 50 States of the Union. The "nation" can therefore, be defined as the 
mathematical union of the federal zone and the 50 States. 
35. The District of Columbia is technically a corporation and is only defined as a "State" in 
its own codes and under International Law (e.g., see 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(10)). 
36. The several States which are united by and under the Constitution are guaranteed a 
"Republican" (or "rule of law") form of government by Article 4, Section 4 of the Constitution. 
However, the foreign nation-state created by Congress and called the "United States", in its 
territorial sense, is a "legislative democracy" (or "majority rule" democracy) which is governed by 
International Law rather than the Common Law. 
37. The U. S. Supreme Court has ruled that this foreign nation has every right to legislate 
for its "citizens" and to hold subject matter and in personam jurisdiction, both within (inside) and 
without (outside) its territorial boundaries, when legislative acts call for such effects (Cook vs Tait. 
supra). 
38. As a foreign nation under International law, which is derived from Roman Civil Law 
(see Kent's Commentaries on American Law, Lecture 1), it is perfectly legal for this nation to 
consider its people as "subjects" rather than as individual Sovereigns. The protections of the State 
and the Federal Constitutions do not apply to these "subjects" unless there is specific statutory 
legislation granting specific protections (e.g., The Civil Rights Act). The guarantees of the 
Constitution extend to the "United States" (i.e. the federal zone) only as Congress has made those 
guarantees applicable (Hooyen, supra). 
39. Texas and Utah are Republics. How does this International Law come into play in the 
Texas and Utah Republics? The answer to this question is presented in the following section. 
FAILURE TO DISCLOSE 
40. Because only "white" people can hold primary Common-Law State Citizenship under 
the Constitution, Congress created a different class of "citizen" and then legislated rights, privileges 
and immunities which were intended to be mirror images of the Rights, Privileges and Immunities 
enjoyed by the Common-Law Citizens of the several States. 
41. Unfortunately, the nation-state of the "United States" (District of Columbia) is a 
democracy and not a Republic. It is governed basically under authority of International Law, rather 
than the Common Law, and its people hold citizenship by "privilege" rather than by "Right". 
42. Certain power-mad individuals, commonly known today as the Directors of the Federal 
Reserve Board and the twelve (12) major international banking families, have used the so-called 
14th Amendment to commit "legal genocide" upon the class of Common-Law Citizens known as the 
Citizens of the several States. This has been accomplished by the application of Social Security 
through fraud, deception and non-disclosure of material facts, for the purpose of reducing the Union 
of States to a people who are once again enslaved by puppet masters, in order to gather revenue 
for the profit of international banks and their owners. 
43. It is a fact so well known and understood that it is indisputable, that "any privilege 
granted by government is regulatable, taxable and subject to any restrictions imposed by the 
legislative acts of its governing body", including alteration and even revocation by that governing 
body. 
44. If necessary to do so, the Defendant/Appellant will submit an offer of proof to show that 
the "Social Security Act" is in fact a private act applying only to the territory of the "United States", 
acting in its limited capacity, and to its statutory "citizens of the United States", under the so-called 
14th Amendment. Yet, this act has been advertised and promoted throughout the several States of 
the Union as being "mandatory upon the public in general", rather than a "private" act. 
45. The effect in law is that, when Common-Law citizens of the several States apply for 
and i Eiceive Social Security Numbers, they voluntarily surrender their primary Common-Law 
Citizeniship of a State and exchange it for that of a statutory "citizen of the United States" It is most 
interesting that any State has the power to "naturalize" a non-Citizen, but today everyone is 
naturalized as "citizens of the United States" under purview of the so-called 14th Amendment. The 
long-term effect of this procedure is that the Common-Law white State Citizens are an endangered 
species, on the verge of extinction, and only the "subject class citizens" will survive to be ruled at the 
whim and passion of a jurisdiction which was not intended by our Founding Fathers or the Framers 
of the original U.S. Constitution. 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
• '46;,..' .Section I of the so-called 14th Amendment has had a far-reaching effect upon i tl i 3 
several States of this Union, because Congress mandated that it would protect its new statutory 
"citizens" and that each of the States would also guarantee to protect these special "citizens". 
47 1his Nation was founded upon the fundamental principles of the Common Law and 
self-government, with limited actual government. In contrast, the "subjects" of the "United States" 
are considered to be incapable of self-government and in need of protection and regulation by 
those in authority. 
48. The majority of statute law is civil and regulatory in nature, even when sanctions of a 
criminal nature are attached for alleged violations. 
49. Among the rights secured by the Common Law in the Constitution in "criminal" cases 
are the right to know the "nature and cause" of an accusation, the right to confront an accuser, and 
the right to have both substantive and procedural due process. 
50 It is a fact that the District Court DOES NOT disclose the nature and cause of the 
accusation, does not afford "substantive" due process, and rarely produces a "corpus delicti* to 
prove damage or an injured party. 
51. 1 \ le final proof is that the rights given to an accused in a compeled compliance case 
are "civil rights", rather than Constitutional Rights 1 he District Court can hear a Constitutional 
question, but it cannot rule upon the merits of the question, because the Constitution does not apply 
to regulatory statutes. They are set in place to regulate and protect the statutory "citizens of the 
United States" who cannot exercise, and are not given, the right of individual self-government. 
52. 1 he Federal Constitutioi » n landates l\ iat "counsel" be pi esent at all phases of the 
proceedings. In contrast, District Court often conducts arraignment proceedings without either 
counsel for the defense or counsel for the prosecution being present. 
CONCLUSION 
53. This Court is proceeding under a jurisdiction which is known to the Constitution, but 
which is foreign to the intent of the Constitution, unless applied to those individuals who do not have 
Common-Law access by "Right" to the protection of the State and Federal Constitutions. 
54. Whether this jurisdiction be named International Law, Admiralty/Maritime Law, 
Legislative Equity, Statutory Law or any other name, it is abusive and destructive of the Common-
Law Rights of the Citizens of the several States. The Constitutions of the Utah Republic and the 
United States of America mandate that these rights be guaranteed and protected by all agencies of 
government. This is the Supreme Law of our Land. 
55. The limit of police power and legislative authority is reached when a statutory "law" 
derogates or destroys Rights which are protected by the Constitution and which belong to the 
Common-Law Citizens of the several States who can claim these Rights. 
56. Robert Harold Boaz is a white, male Common-Law Citizen of the Sovereign Texas 
State/Republic. This declaration of status is made openly and notoriously on the record of these 
proceedings. 
57. As an individual whose primary Common-Law Citizenship is of the Texas 
State/Republic, Robert Harold Boaz claims all the Rights, Privileges and Immunities afforded and 
protected by the Constitutions of the Texas State/Republic (1845) and of the United States of 
America (1787), as lawfully amended. 
58. Robert Harold Boaz has never, to the best of his knowledge and belief, knowingly, 
intentionally and voluntarily surrendered his original status as a Common-Law Citizen of the 
several States, to become a so-called 14th Amendment Federal citizen who is subject to the 
jurisdiction of the "United States". 
59. This Court is proceeding in a legislative jurisdiction which allows a "civil" statute to be 
used as evidence of the Law in a "criminal proceeding", and affords only "civil rights", "procedural 
due process" and the right to be heard on the facts evidenced in the statute, rather than the Law and 
the facts. 
60. It is now incumbent upon the Court to seat on the Law side of its jurisdiction and to 
order the plaintiff to bring forth an offer of proof that the Defendant/Appellant Robert Harold Boaz 
can be subjected to a jurisdiction which uses civil statutes as evidence of the fundamental Law in 
criminal cases, which refuses to afford all Rights guaranteed by the Constitution and available to the 
Accused in criminal matters, and which practices procedural due process to the exclusion of 
substantive due process, wherein only the "facts" and not the "facts and Law" are at issue. 
61. Should the prosecution fail to bring forth proof that the Defendant/Appellant, Robert 
Harold Boaz has surrendered his original status as a Common-Law "Texas State Citizen" for one 
that is essentially in "legislative/regulatory equity", then this Court has no alternative but to dismiss 
this matter of its own motion in the interests of justice, for lack of jurisdiction. 
Dated, February 18, 1995 
Respectfully Submitted, 
Citizen of the Texas State/Republic 
In Propria Persona, Sui Juris 
C E R 1 I F I! C A T E O F S E R V I C E 
I, Robert Harold Boaz, under penalties of perjury, declare that 1 am a Texas Citizen, domiciled 
in the Texasa State/Republic, and a Citizen of the several States united by and under the 
Constitution of the United States of America (see 4:2:1). I am not a "citizen of the United States" 
(District of Columbia) nor a subject of Congress under the 14th Amendment, nor a "resident" in the 
State of Texas who seeks or who is otherwise is i ind sr the protection of the so-called 14th 
Amendment. 
It is hereby certified that service qphfs notice has been made on the Plaintiff/Appellee and 
other interested parties by personal service or by mailing one copy each thereof, on this 2=L£t 
day of f j . f t fu**^ , 1995. 
Robert Harold Boaz, Sui Juris,In Propria Persona 
Defendant/Appellant, 
c/o 424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-5444 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ADDENDUM TO 
STATE OF UTAH, : MEMORANDUM OF LAW 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. Case No.940245-ca 
Robert Harold Boaz, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
ARGUMENT 
THE 14TH AMENDMENT WAS NOT PROPERLY APPROVED AND ADOPTED ACCORDIr 
TO THE MANDATES OF THE CONSTITUTION 
AND THE MAXIMS OF LAW; 
IT DID NOT INCLUDE THE WHITE CITIZENS OF THE SEVERAL STATES, 
AND DID NOT AUTHORIZE CONGRESS TO ABOLISH 
THE INTENT AND MEANING OF THE ORIGINAL CONSTITUTION (1787) 
OR TO CREATE A NEW CONSTITUTION UNDER THE 14TH AMENDMENT, 
THEREBY DEPRIVING THE DEFENDANT, 
A WHITE DEJURESTATE CITIZEN, 
OF HIS UNALIENABLE RIGHTS TO LIFE, LIBERTY AND PROPERTY. 
POINT 1 
7 \ le Defendant/Appellant was indicted undei the p \ mi view of the so-caiieu Ih 
Amendment. Therefore, the constitutionality and applicatiori of this so-called amendment is 
brought squarely before this Court 
The so-called 14th Amendment is invalid, ii i :' ' " NOT properly approved and 
adopted according to the provisions of Article 5 of the ion (see House Congressional 
Record for June 13, 1967, pages 15641-15648 
"I he Fourteenth Amendment was forced upon the people "at the point of a bayonet" 
and by the coercion that resulted from not seating various senators who would not vote in 
favor of the so-called amendment, and various other improper proceedings too numerous to 
mention here (for details, see 28 Tulane Law Review 22; 11 South Carolina Law Quarterly 
484). It is apparent that, once a fraud is perpetrated, the fraud enlarges from the effort to 
maintain illegitimate power and to conceal its legal effect upon the invalidity of the so-called 
14th Amendment 
• j h e so-called I4tl i Amendment" cannot ai id does not terminate the Constitutional 
intent of de jure State Citizenship of the Defendant/Appellant There is ample evidence that 
no court has ever held that this "Amendment" was properly approved and adopted. See, in 
particular, UTAH SUPREME COURT, State vs Phillips. 540 P.2d 936 (1975); Dvett vs Turner. 
439 P.2d 266 (1968). 
[continue 'Ill ] 
POINT 2: 
THE ACCUSED'S DEJURECITIZENSHIP 
CANNOT BE TAKEN AWAY 
The presumed 14th Amendment is illegally applied to the Defendant/Appellant, a male 
Caucasian born in the State of Kansas and now a Citizen of the Texas State/Republic. The 
Defendant/Appellant was not within the intent or meaning of the so-called 14th Amendment. 
It may be stated, as a general principle of law, that it is for the legislature to determine 
whether the conditions exist which warrant the exercise of power; but the question 
as to what are the subjects of its exercise, is clearly a judicial question. 
One may be deprived of his liberty, and his constitutional rights thereto may be 
violated, without actual imprisonment or restraint of his person. 
fin re Aubrey. 36 Wn 308, 314-314, 78 P. 900] 
[emphasis added] 
The most important thing to be determined is the intent of Congress. The language of 
the statute may not be distorted under the guise of construction, so as to be repugnant to the 
Constitution, or to defeat the manifest intent of Congress. United States vs Alpers. 338 U.S. 
680, 94 L.Ed. 457, 460; United States vs Ravnor. 302 U.S. 540, 82 LEd. 413, 58 S.Ct. 353. 
Citizenship is a status or condition, and is the result of both act and intent. 14 C.J.S. 
Section 1, p. 1130, n. 62. 
14th Amendment federal citizenship is a political status which constitutes a privilege 
which may be defined and limited by Congress, Ex Parte (nq) Fung Sing. D.C. Wash. 6 F.R.D. 
670. There is a clear distinction between federal and State citizenship, K. Tashiro vs Jordan, 
256 P. 545, 201 Cal. 239, 53 A.L.R. 1279, affirmed 49 S.Ct. 47, 278 U.S. 123, 73 L.Ed. 214, 
14 C.J.S. 2, p. 1131, n. 75. 
The classification "citizen of the United States" is distinguished from a Citizen of one of 
the several States, in that the former is a special class of citizen created by Congress, U.S. vs 
Anthony, 24 Fed 829 (1873). As such, a "citizen of the United States" receives created rights 
and privileges from Congress, and thus has a "taxable citizenship" as a federal citizen under 
the protection and jurisdiction of Congress, wherever such citizens are "resident". Cook vs 
Tait, 265 U.S. 47 (1924), 44 S. Ct. 447; 11 Virginia Law Review 607, "Income Tax Based 
Upon Citizenship". This right to tax federal citizenship is an inherent right under the rule of 
the Law of Nations, which is part of the law of the "United States", as described in Article 1, 
Section 8, Clause 17 (1:8:17) and Article 4, Section 3, Clause 2 (4:3:2). The Lusitania, 251 F. 
715, 732. The federal government has absolutely no authority whatsoever to tax the Citizens 
of the several States for their Citizenship. The latter have natural rights and privileges which 
are protected by the U.S. Constitution from federal intrusion. These rights are inherent from 
birth and belong to "US the People" as Citizens of one of the several States as described in 
Dred Scott vs Sanford, 19 How. 393. Such Citizens are not under the direct protection or 
jurisdiction of Congress, but they are under the protection of the Constitutions of the States 
which they inhabit. 
The Act of Coi igress called the Civil Rights Act, 14 U.S. Statutes at Large, p. 27, which 
was the forerunner of the so-called 14th Amendment, amply shows the intent of Congress, as 
follows: 
... [A]ll persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, 
excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United 
States, and such citizens of every race and color... shall have the same right in every 
state and territory of the United States to full and equal benefit of all laws and 
proceedings for the security of person and property as is enjoyed by white citizens .... 
[emphasis added] 
This was the intent of Congress, namely, not to infringe upon the Constitution or the status of 
the de jure Citizens of the several States. The term "persons" did not include the white de 
jure State Citizens. It was never the intent of the 14th Amendment to subvert the authority of 
the several States of the Union, or that of the Constitution as it relates to the status of de jure 
State Citizens. See People vs Washington, 36 C. 658, 661 (1869), overruled on other 
grounds; also French vs Barber, 181 U.S. 324; MacKenzie vs Hare, 60 L. Ed. 297 
The so-called 14th Amendment uses language ve:\ Similar to the Civil Rights Act of 
1866. Harlan J. explained his interpretation of its meaning in a dissenting opinion which 
quoted from the scorching veto message of President Johnson, Lincoln's successor: It 
"comprehends the Chinese of the Pacific States, Indians subject to taxation, the people 
called Gypsies, as well as the entire race designated as blacks, persons of color, negroes, 
mulattoes and persons of African blood. Every individual of those races born in the United 
States is made a citizen thereof." Elk vs Wilkins. 112 U.S. 94, 114, 5 S.Ct. 41, 28 LEd. 643; 
see also In re Gee Hop, 71 Fed. 274. 
In light of the statement by Chief Justice Taney in Dred Scott vs Sanford, 19 How. 3y3, 
422, in defining the term persons, the Judge mentioned "... persons who are not recognized 
as citizens .." See also American and Ocean Ins. Co. vs Canter, 1 Pet. 511, which also 
distinguishes "persons" and "citizens". These were the persons who were the object of the 
14th Amendment, to give citizenship to this class of native born "persons" who were 
"resident" in the several States, and to legislate authority to place races other than the white 
race within the special category of "citizen of the United States". 
It was the intent of the so-called amendment X\ lat dejure Citizens in the several States 
were not included in its terminology because they were, by birthright, Citizens as defined in 
the Preamble, and could receive nothing from this so-called amendment. See Va n 
Valkenburg vs Brown, 43 Cal. Sup. Ct 43. 
Congress has adopted this definition of "persoi" . eviously described, so that the 
Internal Revenue Code would be constitutional. See McBrier vs Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue, 108 F.2d 967, Fn 1 (1939). Thus, Congress has absolute authority to regulate this 
de facto entity created by an Act of Congress, this juristic person who is not given de jure 
State Citizenship by birth. 
Since the term "citizer i c f tl le United States" was used to create and distinguish -
different class of citizen in the 14th Amendment, this term has been widely use. 
revenue acts, eg., Tariff Act of August 5, 1909, Section 37, c. 6, 36 Stat, i >, Act OT 
September 8, 1916, 39 Stat. 756; Revenue Act of November 23, 1921, 40 Stat. 227; the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1939 and 26 C.F.R. 1.1-1 (b). These all had a specific meaning, 
which did not include a Citizen of one of the several States who had no franchise with the 
federal Government (i.e., the District of Columbia). In fact, the Social Security Act, 49 Stat. 
620, Title I, Section 3, (3) states: 
(3) Any citizenship requirement which excludes any citizen of the United States. 
This specifically means that the Original Social Security Act, created in 1935, did not 
change one's citizenship upon obtaining a SSN. The original Title VIII of the Social Security 
Act was repealed by P.L. 76-1, Section 4, 53 Stat. 1, effective February 11, 1939. Then the 
substance was added to the 1939 Income Tax Code at Sections 1400-1425. Currently, the 
substance of the repealed section can be found in the 1954 Internal Revenue Code at 
Sections 3101-3126. This repealing, in effect, has voided the original intent and meaning, 
and replaced it with a new intent and meaning. This new intent is unconstitutionally applied 
to the Defendant/Appellant, a de jure State Citizen, who is a member of the posterity as 
identified in the Preamble to the Constitution for the United States of America. This new 
intent has never been addressed by any court, as it relates to the deprivation of State 
Citizenship. 
All changes made after the fact, under the Social Security Act as it relates to 
citizenship, are null and void due to fraud (specifically, non-disclosure). Congress does not 
now, nor has it ever had, the authority to take Citizenship away from the Defendant/Appellant, 
a Citizen of the several States, without his knowledge and informed consent. 
The error occurs when, through economic duress and the failure to disclose to the 
Defendant/Appellant the liabilities associated with a Social Security Number, a de jure State 
Citizen is compelled "at the point of a bayonet" to give up a Citizenship that was derived by 
birth and blood. By obtaining a Social Security Number, such a State Citizen becomes, in 
effect, a second-class citizen under the so-called 14th Amendment, in order to obtain work to 
purchase necessities to sustain life. 
The so-called 14th Amendment was not intended to impose any new restrictions upon 
Citizenship, or to prevent anyone from becoming a Citizen by fact of birth within the United 
States of America, who would thereby acquire Citizenship according to the law existing 
before its adoption. "An amendatory act does not alter the rights existing before its adoption." 
Billings vs Hall, 7 Cal. 1. Its main purpose was to establish the citizenship of free negroes 
and to put it beyond doubt that all blacks as well as whites were citizens. U.S. vs Wong Kim 
Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 18 S.Ct. 456, 42 L.Ed. 890; Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. (U.S.) 36, 
21 LEd. 394; Strauder vs West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 25 L.Ed. 664; In re Virginia, 100 U.S. 
339; Neal vs Delaware. 103 U.S. 370, 26 L.Ed. 567; Elk vs Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 5 S.Ct. 41, 
28 LEd. 643; Van Valkenburg vs Brown. 43 Cal. 43, 13 Am. Rep. 136; (numerous other cites 
omitted). 
The First Clause of the so-called 14th Amendment of the Federal Constitution made 
negroes "citizens of the United States" and citizens of the State in which they reside, and 
thereby created two classes of citizens: one of the United States and the other of the State. 4 
Dec. Dig. '06, page 1197; Cory vs Carter, 48 Ind. 327,17 Am. Rep. 738; and it distinguishes 
between federal and state citizenship, Frasher vs State, 3 Tex. App. 263, 30 Am. Rep. 131. 
Nothing can be found in the so-called 14th Amendment, or in any reference thereto, 
that establishes any provision that transforms Citizens of any state into "citizens of the United 
States". In the year 1868 or now (1994), the so-called amendment created no new status for 
the white State Citizens. White State Citizens are natural born Citizens, per Article 2, Section 
1, Clause 5 (2:1:5) and, as such, they are fully entitled to the "Privileges and Immunities" 
mentioned in Article 4, Section 2, Clause 1 (4:2:1), as unalienable rights. These unalienable 
rights cannot be overruled or abolished by any act of congress. 
The birthright of the Defendant/Appellant's de jure State Citizenship cannot be 
subordinated merely because Congress desires more power and control over the people, in 
order' to create a larger revenue base for the profit of certain private individuals. Ovama vs 
California. 332 U.S. 633. 
State citizenship, as defined, regulated and protected by oiate authority, would 
disappear altogether, except as Congress might choose to withhold the exercise of 
powers. The tendency of Congress, especially since the adoption of the recent 
amendments, has been to overstep its own boundaries and undertake duties not 
committed to it by the Constitution. 
. nibitB)] 
A citizen may not have his de jure citizenship taken away, Richards vs Secretary of 
State. (9th Cir) 752 F.2d 1413, (1985); Afrovim vs Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 87 S.Ct. 1660, 18 
LEd.2d 757 (1967); Baker vs Rusk, 296 F. Supp. 1244 (1969); Vance vs Terrazas. 444 U.S. 
252, 100 S.Ct. 540, 62 LEd.2d 461 (1980); U.S. vs Wong Kim Ark. 169 U.S. 18 S. Ct. 456, 
42 L.Ed. 890(1898). 
POINT 3 
formation of the Constitution for the United States of America, care was taken to 
confer no power upon the federal government to control and regulate Citizens within the 
several States, because such control would lead to tyranny. 
By the Constitution, Congress was to be a representative of, and an extension of the 
Several States only for external affairs. Congress was forbidden to pass municipal laws to 
regulate and control de jure Citizens of a State of the Union of the United States of America. 
This is, without a doubt, the true construction of the intent of the Constitution. 
That Congress has no authority to pass laws and bind the rights of the Citizens in the 
several States, beyond the powers conferred by the Constitution, is not open to controversy. 
But, it is insisted that (1) under the so-called 14th Amendment, Congress has power to 
legislate for, and make a subject of, the Defendant/Appellant through secret interpretations of 
the law and (2) by force of power, laws are enacted in order to control, by force and fraud, the 
Nation and the People within the several States for the purpose of raising revenue for the 
profit of the Federal Reserve banks and their private owners. 
No rational man can hesitate to believe that the deprivations of Citizenship and the 
abuses of the Constitution are not derived from the Federal Reserve Act. No one can deny 
that Congress has thereby attempted to abolish the classification of de jure Citizen of a State 
of the Union of the United States, so that a ever larger revenue base can be maintained. 
This establishes, without a doubt, that the United States government is only concerned 
about raising revenue under forced extraction by the withholding system, which was 
prompted by the Federal Reserve banks at the instigation of Beardsley Ruml, former 
chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 
Congress, through Social Security and the so-called 14th Amendment, cannot do 
indirectly what the Constitution prohibits directly. If Congress, by pseudo power, can legislate 
away the Defendant/Appellant's status as a de jure Citizen of the several States, so might 
Congress exclude all of Robert Harold Boaz' unalienable rights as protected and guaranteed 
by the Constitution. 
Social Security and the Federal Reserve banks, by creating a fictitious debt, have re-
instituted an insidious form of slavery. All slavery has its origin in power, thus usurping a 
jurisdiction which does not belong to them and which is against the unalienable rights of the 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Our Constitution is a restraint upon government, purposely provided and 
declared upon consideration of all the consequences which it prohibits and 
permits, making restraints upon government the rights of the governed. This 
careful adjustment of power and rights makes the constitution what it was intended to be and 
is, namely, a real charter of liberty which deserves the praise that has often been given to it 
as "The most wonderful work ever struck off at any given time by the brain and purpose of 
man." Block vs Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135. 
Thus, this court must uphold the principles upon which the Constitution was founded; 
it must be held to guarantee not particular forms of procedure, but the very substance of 
individual rights to life, liberty and property. Basic "State Citizenship" is the absolute bulwark 
against "National Tyranny" as is fostered and applied through the so-called 14th Amendment. 
Nowhere in the debates, papers or any court decision written by anyone does it state that the 
Constitution authorizes Congress to destroy the State Citizenship of the Defendant/Appellant. 
Prior to the Federal Reserve Act, no political dreamer was ever wild enough to think of 
breaking down the lines which separate the States, and of compounding the American 
People into one common mass of slaves. Yet, this is exactly what has happened under 
Social Security, by creating a revenue base for the collection of interest on a fictitious 
national debt owed to the Federal Reserve, in other words, slavery to the national debt under 
the so-called 14th Amendment. 
The status of "de jure State Citizen" is Robert Harold Boaz' property. When the 
application of Social Security annihilates the value of any property and strips it of its 
attributes, by which alone it is distinguishable as property, Robert Harold Boaz, a de jure 
State Citizen, is deprived of it according to the plainest interpretation of the 5th Amendment, 
and certainly within the Constitutional provisions intended to shield Robert Harold Boaz 
personal rights and liberty from the exercise of arbitrary government power. 
This is a case of "suspect classification" in that the Defendant/Appellant is "saddled 
with such disabilities ... as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian process 
...." 411 U.S. 2, 28. Thus, the devolution of Robert Harold Boaz' de jure Citizenship into the 
classification of a de facto juristic person under the so-called 14th Amendment is such a 
"suspect classification" and must be reviewed in the light of the original intent of our Founding 
Fathers in establishing the Union of several States in the first place. 
Citizenship under the so-called 14th Amendment is a privilege granted by Congress, 
i.e., a civil status conferring limited rights and privileges, not a birthright that is secured by the 
Constitution. Robert Harold Boaz a white dejure State Citizen, by virtue of his birth in one of 
the several States, received that which cannot be granted by Congress, nor can Congress 
make void a Citizenship status which he derived by birth and by blood. 
... [A]nd no member of the state should be disfranchised, or deprived of any of his 
rights or privileges under the constitution, unless by the law of the land, or judgment of 
his peers. 
fKent's Commentaries. Vol. II, p. 11,1873,12th ed.] 
There can be no law, statute or treaty that can be in conflict with the intent of the 
original founding constitution. For, if this were permitted to occur, the founding Constitution 
would be a nullity. The original Constitution of 1787 is perpetual, as is the Citizenship that is 
recognized by it. See Texas vs White. 7 Wallace 700. If any legislation is repugnant to the 
Constitution, this Court has the eminent power to declare such enactments null and void ab 
initio (from their inception). See Marburv vs Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-180 
(1803). 
The rule that should be applied is that laws, especially foundational laws such as our 
Constitution, should be interpreted and applied according to the plain import of the language 
used, as it would have been the intent and understood by our Founding Fathers. The so-
called 14th Amendment has been used to distort and nullify the purposes and intent of the 
foundational Constitution, for the ulterior motive of giving pseudo power where no such 
power was granted or intended, and where such pseudo power was specifically denied in 
the Constitution. 
This has resulted in the complete annihilation of the balance of checks, so desired by 
our Founding Fathers. One of these was the sovereignty of the people. At the present time, 
the "United States", under Article 1, Section 8, Clause 17, has extended its pseudo authority 
to abolish the status of de jure State Citizens, and to render Robert Harold Boaz a "federal" 
citizen under the so-called 14th Amendment who is more apply described as a subject of 
Congress and a "federal" resident within the several States. This has had the unlawful effect 
of denying Robert Harold Boaz birthright to be a free born de jure State Citizen, as was the 
intent of the original Constitution. 
The so-called 14th Amendment did not authorize Congress to change either the 
Citizenship or the status of Citizens of the several States. "They are unaffected by it." U.S. vs 
Anthony. 24 F. 829. Yet, through deliberate misinterpretation of the Act, Congress has by 
statute overruled and voided the Constitution. This was done at the prompting of the Federal 
Reserve banks and their private owners. 
In application, Congress and the Federal Reserve banks have utilized the so-called 
14th Amendment as a totally new Constitution, solely for the benefit of the Federal Reserve, 
and to the detriment of Robert Harold Boaz, a sovereign Citizen of the Texas State/Republic. 
This Union of the United States of America was founded upon the principles of the 
Christianity and the common law. Force and fraud cannot prevail against the will of the 
people and the Constitution. The legislative intent of the so-called 14th Amendment was only 
to grant citizenship to a distinct class of people, not to create a new constitution. This court 
must determine whether the "act" was properly approved and adopted. State vs Phillips, 540 
P.2d 936, 942 (1975). If it was properly approved and adopted, this court must also 
determine if it is also being unconstitutionally applied against the Defendant/Appellant, a de 
jure State Citizen of Texas. 
The abuses heaped upon the Defendant/Appellant, a Texas State Citizen, only foretell 
the impending doom and downfall of a centralized government. Our Founding Fathers 
understood this, and the Constitution was written so that this would not occur. But, to the 
great shame of the judicial system, they have let the thirst for power prevail over the 
Constitution. 
Hitler used National Social Insurance to control and enslave the people of Germany. 
Likewise, the "United States" (Article 1, Section 8, Clause 17) is doing the same thing here in 
America. (Perhaps now it should be spelled "Amerika"). When is enough enough? When 
will the courts quit playing "ostrich", pull their heads out of the sand, see what is happening 
and correct the situation before it is too late. The camel of tyranny now has its nose and its 
two front legs under the tent. 
Congress has passed the 14th Amendment under force of arms, included the 
municipal code of the District of Columbia into the United States Codes, and made various 
secret interpretations of the acts, never inquiring whether they had authority to proceed. But, 
can this Court also undertake for itself the same sundry constructions? The Executive, 
Legislative and Judicial Branches have all repeatedly acknowledged that our particular 
security is in the possession and adherence to the written Constitution. Yet, by various and 
sundry constructions and the wrongful application of the acts of Congress, the House and 
Senate are attempting to turn the Constitution into a blank piece of paper, with complete 
judicial approval. 
Robert Harold Boaz, a de jure natural State Citizen, is in full possession of personal 
and political rights, which the "United States" (Article 1, Section 8, Clause 17) did not give 
and cannot take away. Dred Scott vs Sanford, 19 How. 393, 513; Afrovim vs Rusk, 387 U.S. 
253; U.S. vs Miller, 463 F.2d 600. Nor is the Appellant a de jure State Citizen restrained by 
any enumeration or definition of his rights or liberties. The so-called 14th Amendment did not 
impair or change the status of the de jure Citizens of the several States of the Union of the 
United States of America. To imply that an act of Congress supersedes and makes 
null and void the Constitution for the United States of America, is blatantly and 
demonstrably absurd. This construction cannot be enforced or adopted by any 
legal authority whatsoever. 
The municipal jurisdiction of Congress does not extend to the Defendant/Appellant or 
to his property. This is the case because he is a de jure State Citizen of the several States. 
The municipal jurisdiction of Congress only extends to the limits as defined in the 
Constitution itself (see 1:8:17 and 4:3:2). 
Where rights are secured by the Constitution there can be no legislation or rule 
making which would abrogate them. 
[Miranda vs Arizona, 384 U.S. 436] 
Thus, the Citizenship of the Defendent as a Citizen of Texas 
must be upheld by the preceding positive statement and decree by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
This court must uphold this principle of law. 
THE PREAMBLE AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
ARE IN FULL FORCE AND EFFECT. 
THEREFORE, CONGRESS CANNOT DEPRIVE 
A WHITE STATE CITIZEN OF HIS DE JURE STATE CITIZENSHIP 
AS A MEMBER OF THE POSTERITY, 
AS WAS THE INTENT DEFINED IN THE PREAMBLE. 
POINT 1 
The Preamble to the Constitution of the United State declares the intent and purpose 
of the covenant: 
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish 
justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the 
general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do 
ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America. 
[Preamble] 
Justice Story, in his Commentaries on the Constitution, expounded on the importance of this 
Preamble: 
The importance of examining the preamble, for the purpose of expounding the 
language of a statute, has been long felt, and universally conceded in all judicial 
discussions. It is an admitted maxim in the ordinary course of the administration of 
justice, that the preamble of a statute is a key to open the mind of the makers, as to the 
mischiefs, which are to be remedied, and the objects, which are to be accomplished by 
the provisions of the statute. We find it laid down in some of our earliest authorities in 
the common law; and civilians are accustomed to a similar expression, cessante 
ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex. Probably it has a foundation in the exposition of every 
code of written law, from the universal principle of interpretation, that the will and 
intention of the legislature is to be regarded and followed. It is properly resorted to, 
where doubts or ambiguities arise upon the words of the enacting part; for if they are 
clear and unambiguous, there seems little room for interpretation, except in cases 
leading to an obvious absurdity, or to a direct overthrow of the intention expressed in 
the Preamble. 
fCommentaries on the Constitution of the United States! 
[Joseph Story, Vol. 1, De Capo Press Reprints (1970)] 
[at pages 443, 444] 
With the authority of Justice Story, then, we examine the wording of the Preamble as to 
the term "Union". The term "Union" as used in the Preamble is evidently the one declared in 
the Declaration of Independence (1776) and organized in accordance with "certain articles of 
Confederation and Perpetual Union between the States" which declared that "the Union shall 
be perpetual." See Texas vs White, 7 Wallace 700. 
The Union of the States never was a purely artificial and arbitrary relation. It began 
among Colonies, and grew out of common origin, mutual sympathies, kindred 
principles, similar interest, and geographical relations. It was confirmed strengthened 
by the necessities of war, and received definite form, and character, and sanction from 
the Articles of Confederation. By these the Union was solemnly declared to "be 
perpetual." And when these Articles were found to be inadequate to the exigencies of 
the country, the Constitution was ordained "to form a more perfect union." It is difficult 
to convey the idea of indissoluble unity more clearly than these words. What can be 
indissoluble if a perpetual Union, made more perfect, is not? 
But the perpetuity and indissolubility of the Union, by no means implies the loss of 
distinct and individual existence, or of the right of self-government by the States. 
Under the Articles of Confederation each State retained its sovereignty, freedom, and 
independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right not expressly delegated to the 
United States. Under the Constitution, though, the powers of the States were much 
restricted, still, all powers not delegated to the United States, nor prohibited to the 
States, are reserved to the States respectively or to the people. And we have already 
had occasion to remark at this term, that "the people of each State compose a State, 
having its own government, and endowed with all the functions essential to separate 
and independent existence," and that "without the States in union, there could be no 
such political body as the United States." Not only, therefore, can there be no loss of 
separate and independent autonomy to the States, through their union under the 
Constitution, but it may be not unreasonably said that the preservation of the States, 
and the maintenance of their governments, are as much within the design and care of 
the maintenance of the National government. The Constitution, in all its provisions, 
looks to an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States. 
When, therefore, Texas became one of the United States, she entered into a 
indissoluble relation. All the obligations of perpetual union, and all the guarantees of 
republican government in the Union, attached at once to the State. The act which 
consummated her admission into the Union was something more than a compact; it 
was the incorporation of a new member into the political body. And it was final. The 
union between Texas and the other States was as complete, as perpetual, and as 
indissoluble as the union between the original States. There was no place for 
reconsideration, or revocation, except through revolution, or through consent of the 
States. 
ITexas vs White. 7 Wallace, at pages 723 to 726 (1886)] 
Similarly, the term "establish", as used in the Preamble, means to fix perpetually: 
STAB'LISH ... 
1. To set and fix firmly or unalterable; to settle 
permanently. 
I will establish my covenant with him for an 
everlasting covenant. Gen. xvii 
2. To found permanently; to erect and fix or settle; 
as, to establish a colony or empire. 
3. To enact or decree by authority and for permanence 
4. To settle or fix; to confirm. 
5. To make firm; to confirm; to ratify what has 
been previously set or made. 
Do we then make void the law through faith? God 
forbid: yea, we establish the law. Rom. iii. 
[An American Dictionary of the English Language! 
[Noah Webster (1828), reprinted by] 
[Foundation for American Christian Education (1967)] 
ESTABLISH. This word occurs frequently in the Constitution of the United States, and 
it is there used in different meanings: 
1. to settle firmly, to fix unalterable; as to 
establish justice, which is the avowed object of 
the Constitution... 
2. To settle or fix firmly; place on a permanent 
footing; found; create; put beyond doubt or 
dispute; prove; convince... 
[Black's Law Dictionary, supra, at page 642] 
Thus, if the Union is perpetual, then so too is the founding law upon which that Union 
was predicated in the first place, and so too is the unalienable Citizenship recognized 
therein. 
POINT 2 
THE ORGANIC LAW 
AND THE UNION FOUNDED THEREON 
ARE PERPETUAL 
The founding law of the nation is the perpetual authority upon which the continued 
existence of the nation itself is predicated. As such, the founding law carries universal 
authority and cannot be overthrown or subverted without repudiating the very existence of the 
nation established thereby. 
ORGANIC LAW. The fundamental law, or constitution, of a state or nation, written or 
unwritten; that law or system of laws or principles which defines and establishes the 
organization of its government. St. Louis vs Dorr, 145 Mo. 466, 46 S.W. 976, 42 LRA 
686, 68 Am St Rep 575 
Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., West Pub. (1968), p. 1251] 
The authority of the organic law is universally acknowledged; it speaks the sovereign 
will of the people; its injunction regarding the process of legislation is as authoritative 
as are those touching the substance of it. Suth. Statutory Construction, 44, note 1. 
"This Constitution ... shall be the supreme law of the land ...." Article 6, Constitution of 
the United States (1787). 
That the people have an original right to establish, for their future government, such 
principles as, in their opinion, shall be most conducive to their own happiness, is the 
basis on which the whole American fabric has been erected. The exercise of the 
original right is a very great exertion, nor can it, nor ought it to be frequently repeated. 
The principles, therefore, so established, are deemed fundamental. And as the 
authority, from which they proceed, is supreme, and can seldom act, they are designed 
to be permanent. 
The original and supreme will organizes the government, and assigns, to different 
departments, their respective powers. It may either stop here; or establish certain 
limits not to be transcended by those departments. 
The government of the United States is of the latter description. The powers of the 
legislature are defined, and limited; and those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, 
the constitution is written. To what purpose are the powers limited, and to what 
purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if the limits may, at any time be passed 
by those intended to be restrained? The distinction, between a government with 
limited and unlimited powers, is abolished, if those limits do not confine the persons on 
whom they are imposed, and if acts prohibited and acts allowed, are of equal 
obligation. It is a proposition too plain to be contested, that the constitution controls 
any legislative act repugnant to it; or, that the legislature may alter the constitution by 
an ordinary act. 
Between these alternatives there is no middle ground. The constitution is either a 
superior, paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with 
ordinary legislative acts, and like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall 
please to alter it. 
If the former part of the alternative be true, then a legislative act contrary to the 
constitution is not law: if the latter be true, then written constitutions are absurd 
attempts, on the part of the people, to limit a power, in its own nature illimitable. 
Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming 
the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and consequently the theory of 
every such government must be, that an act of the legislature, repugnant to the 
constitution, is void .... 
If then the courts are to regard the constitution; and the constitution is superior to any 
ordinary act of the legislature; the constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern 
the case to which they both apply. 
Those then who controvert the principle that the constitution is to be considered, in 
court, as a paramount law, are reduced to the necessity of maintaining that the courts 
must close their eyes on the constitution, and see only the law. 
[Marbury vs Madison, 1 Cranch 137, at pages 176 to 178] 
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llic United States 
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Annotations from federal and State (louris 
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Note 72 
plainly immaterial «>r i r re levant to the Subpoenas of an administ rat ive agency, 
a<lniiiiistrative investigation. Securities though validly issued, need not bo en-
and Kxrhango Commission v. Kaplan . I>. forced pre<isely according to terms or 
C N Y.IJ'7.1 !ii*7 F.Supp. ,1<U. without modification, and whenever it is 
made !«» appear that n subpoena is so 
nn | .r ;nioii of Ic . lc ial ' l 'rade Commis- |> r o . , ( J |y drawn as to be oppressive and 
>ioii lor ..rdrr r e p i n i n g party to produce
 u i m . . , s l ,„ j , i ,W\ j | j s the duty of the court 
documents in accordance with subpoena
 | u , , n , v n i , „ |M l M . (,f \\s process and to 
issued l,y hearing examiner, district
 p | j l o > s m h | i m i h , , i o I I S U | m „ {\w subpoena 
courfs deierminalmn is limited lo ques-
 a s i s j u s ( l l m | v\^nt nI1,|«.f nil Hip ci ivum-
tion u h - t h e r Commission abnsod its dis-
 ! s t l u u . , . s . Federal Communicat ions Cum-
in issuing subpoena. \\ T. C. v. , l l i s s j ( , „ v . Cohn, P.C.N.Y. 111.17. 154 F. 
Supp. M>!>. I". S. I'ij.c ^ Foundry Co.. P.C.P.C.l'.Miu, 
;iul F.Supp. lJ.lt. 
Where Federal Homo Loan Hank Hoard 71. I 'artiul enforcement 
appointed supervisory representat ive in 'Vh'm section authorized trial court to 
charge who took possession and control order par t ia l compliance, wi th Federal 
of a federal savings and loan association Trade Commission orders d i rect ing cor-
ami Hoard appointed hear ing officer to porat inn to furnish certain information, 
determine whether g rounds existed for
 ;NJ(j j j J ( . 11- i JI J court , after f inding the or-
appointment of conservator for associa- , j o r s part ial ly invalid, was not required 
lion, and association charged that mem- j ( ) s t r ike them and direct the Commission 
hers of Hoard were biased and secured
 t o issue new orders if it wished to pro-
subpoeiia.^ and subpoenas duces tecum ,.,.lMi w j t | , f j s inquiry. St. Hegis Paper 
from liearing officer, and association
 ( . ( ) v r , s . , N.Y.lDdl, 82 S.Ct. 2S9. 'M\H V. 
filed petition to enforce, subpoenas anil s. 208, 7 F.Kd.2d 210, rehear ing denied S2 
the Hoard had never determined the < Ct |-<7 :w.S I ' S . i»T2. 7 L.Kd.'-M 401. inn-
t imel iuos , sufficiency or good faith of | j , m denied 82 S.Ct. UNO, IWU F.S. 8oi>, 7 
the bias (barges, or their merits, associa- F.Fd.2d Oil. 
lion's amendment which was offered in 
the enforcement proceeding and which --, Order 
•d ihat hearing officer was disqual-
 n r d | i r u f C I | f u r t . L M l i e I l t o f subpoenas 
il'ied was premature. Lung Peach Feder- duces tecum issued by Secretary of A t r i -
al Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home
 vuU U I u l o r , , U ( : k c r 8 R l u l s t o c k y a r d s 
Loan Hank Hd.. J ..C.Cal. Il>o0, J 81) F.Supp. ^ ^ . ^
 m ^ <)f T 1 | | | I 7> J s hliU,. 
:,S!». reversed on other grounds 205 F.2d ^ ^ n l and supersedes the subpoena. V. 
l o i
 S. v. Marshall P u r b i n & Co. of l l a ley-
ville. Inc., C.A.Ala. 10(50. 3<W F.2d L 
l.i. Modification of subpoena 
Subpoena duces tecum issued by Nil- 70. Contempt 
tional Labor Relations Hoard as incident
 J m l i r i u l r e i n e d y made available with 
of unfair labor practice complaint need ,0 | . t | o a ( l l I l i n i s t rnUve subpoenas , if 
not be enforced precisely according to its
 | U . ( 1 | | s enforceable as any court or-
tcrn.s u i thout modification, hut if it is
 d < i r ^ {n | l | | n , K h f o r eontempt . 
too broad or is oppressively d rawn, or ^ ^ ^
 M h | m i | s & Chemical Co. v. Secu-
will be enforced capriciously or oppres-
 r i ( | | i 8 a n d K x f . | | | 1 I I K e Commission, C.A. 
sively, it may be modified by court . N. ... , ,,..,. ,,ou ., ,tA . ,u r 
I.. Jt. H. v. Anchor Home Mills, Inc., C. 
A Ca. 10.12, 107 F.2d 117. 
§ 5 5 6 . H e a r i n g s ; p r e s id ing e m p l o y e e s ; powers and dut ies; 
burden of proof; evidence; record a s bas is of d e -
cision 
(a) This section applies, accord ing the provis ions thereof, to 
hearings required by section 553 or 554 of th i s t i t le to be conducted 
in accordance with this section. 
(b) There shall preside a t the t ak ing of evidence— 
(1) the agency; 
(2) on or more members of the body which comprises the 
agenr 
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(3) 07ie or more hear ing examiners appointed under section 
:U05of this t i t le. 
This subchapter dors not supersede the conduct of specified classes 
of proceedings, in whole or in part , by or before boards or other em-
ployees specially provided for by or designated under s ta tu te . The 
functions of presiding employees and of employees par t ic ipa t ing in 
decisions in accordance with section 557 of this title shall be con-
ducted in an impartial manner. A pres id ing or par t ic ipa t ing em-
ployee may at any time disqualify himself. On the filing in good 
faith of a timely and sufficient affidavit of personal bias or other 
disqual if icat ion of a presiding or par t i c ipa t ing employee, the agency 
shall determine the matter as a par t of the record and decision in 
the case. 
(c) Subject to published rules of the agency and within its pow-
ers, employees presiding at hearings may— 
(1) adminis ter oaths and a f f i rma t ions ; 
(2) issue subpenas authorized by law; 
(.'*) rule on offers of proof and receive re levant evidence; 
(4) take depositions or have deposit ions taken when the ends 
of jus t ice would be served ; 
(5 ) regula te the course of the h e a r i n g ; 
(G) hold conferences for the se t t lement or simplification of 
the issues by consent of the p a r t i e s ; 
(7) dispose of procedural reques ts or s imi lar ma t t e r s ; 
(8) make or recommend decisions in accordance with section 
557 of this t i t l e ; and 
(9) take other action author ized by agency rule consis tent 
with this subchapter . 
(d) Except as otherwise provided by s ta tu te , the proponent of a 
ru le or order has the burden of proof. Any oral or documentary ev-
idence may be received, but the agency as a mat te r of policy shal l 
provide for the exclusion of i r relevant , immater ia l , or unduly repet i -
t ious evidence. A sanction may not be imposed or rule or order is-
sued except on consideration of the whole record or those pa r t s 
thereof cited by a party and suppor ted by and in accordance with 
the rel iable, probative, and subs tan t ia l evidence. The agency may, 
to the extent consistent with the in te res t s of jus t ice and the policy 
of the under ly ing s ta tu tes adminis te red by the agency, consider a 
violation of section 557(d) of this t i t le suff ic ient g rounds for a de-
cision adverse to a party who has knowingly committed such viola-
tion or knowingly caused such violation to occur. A par ty is ent i -
tled to present his case or defense by oral or documentary evidence, 
to submit rebut ta l evidence, and to conduct such cross-examinat ion 
as may be required for a full and t rue disclosure of the facts . In 
ru le making or determining claims for money or benefi ts or appliea-
5 §556 THE AGENCIES GENERALLY Ch. 
lions for initial licenses an agency may, when a par ty will not be 
prejudiced thereby, adopt procedures for the submission of all or 
part of the evidence in wri t ten form. 
(c) The t ranscr ip t of testimony and exhibits, together with all pa-
pers and requests filed in the proceeding, cons t i tu tes the exclusive4 
record for decision in accordance with section 557 of this t i t le and, 
on payment of lawfully prescribed costs, shall be made available to 
the part ies . When an agency decision res ts on official notice of a 
material fact not appearing in the evidence in the record, a party is en-
titled, on timely request , to an opportuni ty to show the contrary . 
Pub.L. 80-554, Sept. C>, 19GG, 80 Stat. 386; Pub.L. 94-409, § 4 (c ) , 
Sept. ]:*, 1970,90 Stat . 1217. 
Derivation: 
H i s t o r i c a l a n d R e v i s i o n N o t e s 
I'nttcd States Code 
5 U.S.C. 100(5 
Kcvised Statutes and Statutes at Large 
Juno 11, lOlii, eh. 324, § 7, 00 Stat. 211. 
Explanatory Notch 
in Mjl'.sorlioji (It), the words "lwnrint* 
cMiiniiiiTs" nro snbstituled for "examin-
ers" iu paragraph (3) for clarity. The 
prohibition in the second .sentence is re-
stated in positive form and the words 
"This subchapter does not" are substi-
tuted for "hut nothing in this chapter 
shall be deemed to". The words "em-
ployee" and "employees" are substituted 
for "officer" and "officers" in view of 
the definition of "employee" i»» section 
2105. The sentence "A presiding or par-
ticipating employee may at any time dis-
qualify himself." is substituted for the 
words "Any such officer may at any 
time withdraw if he deems himself dis-
qualified." 
Standard changes are made to conform 
with the definitions applicable and the 
style of this title as outlined in the pref-
ace to the report. 
1»:6 Amendment. Subsec. (d). Pub.L. 
01-100 added provisions relating to con-
sideration by the uKeney of a violation 
under section 557(d) of this title. 
Effect i \o Date of 1076 Amendment. 
Amendment by Pub.L. 04-400 effective ISO 
days after .Sept. 13, 1070, see section 6 of 
Pub.L. 01-100, set out as a note under 
section 552b of this title. 
Hearing: Examiners Employed by De-
partment of Commerce. The functions 
vested by this subchapter and chapter 7 
of this title in hearing examiners em-
ployed by the Department of Commerce 
were not Included in the functions of of-
ficers, Agencies, ami employees of that 
department uhich were transferred to 
the S ' r . | ,v ior,u 
Jieorjr.PJ.'jii No. 5. 5 J. off. .May 2J, 1050. 
15 F.K. 3174, Oft Stat. 1203, set out iu the 
Appendix to this title. 
Hearing Examiners Employed by De-
partment of Interior. Functions vested 
by this subchapter and chapter 7 of this 
title in hearing examiners employed by 
the Department of the Interior were not 
included in the transfer of functions of 
officers, agencies and employees of the 
Department of the Interior to the Secre-
tary of the Interior, made by 1050 
IteoiK Plan No. 3, 5 1, eff. May 21, 1050, 
15 F.R. 3174, 01 Stat. 1202, set out iu the 
Appendix to this title. 
Hearing Examiner* Employed by De-
partment of .lustice. Functions vested by 
this subchapter and chapter 7 of this ti-
tle in hearing examiners employed by the 
Department of Justice were not included 
in the transfer of functions of officers, 
agencies and employees of the Depart-
ment of Justice to the Attorney Genernl, 
made by 1050 Keorg.Plan No. 2, § 1, eff. 
May 24, 1050, 15 F.K. 3173, 04 Stat. 1201, 
set out in the Appendix to this title. 
Hearing Examiners Employed by De-
partment of Labor. The functions vested 
by this subchapter and chapter 7 of this 
title in hearing examiners employed by 
the Department of Labor were not in-
cluded in the transfer of functions of of-
ficers, agencies, and employees of the De-
partment of Labor to the Secretary of 
Labor, made by 1050 Keorg.Plan No. 0, ft 
1. eff. May 21, 1050, 15 F.K. 3174, 04 Stat. 
1203, set out iu the Appendix to this ti-
tle. 
Ch. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 5 § 5 5 6 
Hearing Examiners Employed by He- tary of the Treasury, made by 1050 
partment of Treasury. Functions vested Keorg.Phin No. 2(1, X ], eff. July 31, 1050, 
by this subchapter and chapter 7 of this 15 F.K. 4035, 01 Stat. 12*0, set out In the 
title In hearing examiners employed by Appendix- to this tiile. 
the Department of the Treasury were not 
included In the transfer of functions of 
officers, agencies and employees of the 
I'epartmciit of the Treasury to the Secre-
Lcfflslntlvo History. For legislative 
history and purpose of Pub.L. 04-400, 
see 1070 r.S.Code Cong, and Adm.News, 
p. 2183. 
C r o s i R e f e r e n c e s 
Judicial Officer appointed by Postmaster General as agency, .see section 204 of Title 
30, Postal Service. 
Secretary of Agriculture, advisory committee's report, recommendations, data, and 
statement of reasons on economic poisons as subject to subsec. (d) of this sec-
tion, see section 135b of Title 7, Agriculture. 
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, advisory committee's report, regula-
tions covering pesticides and color additives, see sections 310a and 370 of Title 
21, Food and Drugs. 
Securities and Exchange Commission, delegation of functions by, see section 78d-l 
of Title 15, Commerce and Trade. 
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Department of Labor, public contracts, see 41 CFK 50-203.1 et seq., SO-204.1 et seq., 50-
205.1 et seq. 
National Transportation Safety Board, 
Air safety proceedings, see 49 CFK 821.1 et seq. 
Merchant marine appeals, see 49 CFK 825.1 et seq. 
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w itli ora l h e a r i n g w a s p r o p e r 
v i s i o n nf l l i i - :-••«-« i * • xi ih;il a g e m > i 
w h e n a p a r i y wi l l ., a |..- prcju . i 
a d o p t p r o c e d u r e s f i . r - n b m i s s 
part of c\ id' -i*« ••* in wi il l«i> for 
P e t i t i o n e r s w h o c h a l l e n g e d l n t r r - ! a i " 
<•omii irn o r . . i n i n i s v , , , , , s a p p r o v a l ,,f 
t r a i i - l . r of a l r c n - c i - - n r . | In p a s s e n g e r 
b r o k e r ami u i v i H i . u . p l . ( I l o - i l l . 
mil any ( lor i i in .n l a r v ev i d e i n v were no) 
e n t i t l e d a s a m a i l e r of rt^lil lo an oral 
h e a r i n g a s o p p o - . l lo a review b a s e d on 
(I'M IIIIU n ta i y e v i d c m e IIIMIIT f o r m e r • <'<• 
l i o n tool | „ , , \ i M T I I K I I :..".|| o | ih i - t i t l e 
d e a l i n g w i t h a d j u d i c a t i o n , , r equ ired by 
s t a t u t e . L i n c o l n T r a n s i t Co. \ F. s . I» 
C.N.V.I'.HJt;. LTMI F . S u p p . !»!M». 
W h e r e d e m u r r a g e and pena l tv c h a r g e s 
w e r e a s s e s - e d by c a r r i e r a g a i n s t s h i p p e r 
a n d on c<mi|<lainl l.y d . i p p c t . the In le t 
s t a l e r o i n m c r c e C o m m i s s i o n o r d e r e d the 
p r o c e e d i n g s he h a n d l e d l.y I he m o d i f i e d 
p r o c e d u r e a n d no oral e v i d e n c e w a s of-
lered or rece ived and p r o c e e d i n g s w e r e 
re ferred |.> an i iu . |ua l i l icd e \ a m i m r w h o 
r e p o r t e d a d v e r s e l y lo s h i p p e r , p r o c e d u r e 
a d o p t e d l.y C o m m i s s i o n d id not e l i m i n a t e 
r e q u i r e m e n t of a . | i i a l i f i ed e x a m i n e r , in 
v i ew that t e r m ' h e a r i n g ' a s n - c l in lhi~ 
s e c t i o n meaii.s m o r e lhai i a mere oral 
h e a r i n g a n d i n c l u d e - m o i i i i i c . i | N n , , , | ( l l l 
w h i d i C o m m i s s i o n f o l l o w e d . I l c l i a n c c 
Stee l P r o d m i s Co. v. I S.. I > C Pa 107,7. 
1.10 1 . S u p p . l i s . 
Ch. 
S i m (m ,,( ru l"- of . -v ide i . ee 
are . . b - . - n e d in c o u r t s .•!" law m u \ 
| : , \ e . | - what in :"> a d m i n . - Ma t m 
. . . • d i n g , if i i i n d a m e i i l a l t n . r i t c - - i 
d e p a r t e d H o . . . i r o s e d a h - C c l I 
Jiiret t . r .d T S r .urea-. ••( M m . . 
10..7. 217 I Jd 'JIMI. 
A d o 'in 
i c - t r i . '. d 
I ' . m l . u . i l i , 
it i Ml | l 
I n ; i l l . o f 
• v. F e d e r a l T r a d e Coinin 
-:;:, i"Jd :;n See. a i o . 
misUi . |» .C.ria.!!••;». -'••I I 
: i . i ! i : i m - l r a ( l \ e p f o c 
S h i e l d - . | > . C . N . i l O t 
T M l e -
. d i m 
f'.o o f 
»2 I 
rial r u l e - -
W h e a l ley 
f e v i d e n c e 
IT h e a r i n g doe.-, ii..i a p p l y I.. : i d m i u i - i r 
< I IV.MI \ . K . d a n d . I > C. N. Y. I!»t-Y 217 1 
supp ; n . 
I l l 
. of la I ' . 
I OS. H o l e s of e v i d e n c e a p p l i c a b l e 
T e c h n i c a l r u l e s of e v i d e n c e a p p l i c a b l e in *j|2 I . S u p p . ssi! 
c iv i l t r i a l s a r e not e m p l o y e d in a d m i n i s -
t r a t i v e h e a r i n g s . I 'a ir l -ank v. H a r d i n . C. 
A.Cal .1970, 420 F 2d 2dl , c e r t m r a r i d e n i e d 
111 S.Ct. 211. 1«K» I S . 1113. 27 I. l-al.2d 217. 
. • - l i g a t i o n s h\ f.-d'M.-il a d m i n . - l r a t i v r 
air. n. i. , are not " jud i . lal p r o c e e d iiiL's" 
a n d a r e n»i r e s t r i c t e d by n i l . - ; of , v i 
d e i . . . a p p b . a b l c in ,•„, 
\ . |:. .w m a n . l i .C f a MM 
ai i i im. d :;:,s j *j,t r j i . 
V d m i n U i r a l i v e ag<i, , i. - arc not h o u n d 
by Icehni . - i i l c o m m o n law r u l e s ot evi 
d e u c e . C S. e x rel. I.e.»n v. S h a u g l n i e s -
s y . H .C. .VY.I0 . . 0 . 143 F . S u p p 27n. af-
f i r m e d LT.0 F.2d 4:i«». s . . . ,
 ; , u . . . C l e a r f i e l d 
C h . . - . . c . . v. C. S.. 11 c.M...i«ir.!». Hns F. 
S u p p 1072; Cried \ . I". S , P C X Y10U2. 
A d m i n i s t r a l i v e a g e n c i e s a r e not re-
s t r i c t e d lo r i g i d r u l e s of e v i d e n c e . W'lial 
ey v. t l n r d n e r . C. A.M... 1007. .'{71 V 2d 0 
Sen, j i lso, M a e k a t i m a s v. l-'mch, !>.(' I'a 
1!MM», 301 F . S u p p . 12M». 
Str ic t c o m m o n law r u l e s of e v i d e n c e d o 
not a p p l y to a d m i n i s t r a t i v e h e a r i n K s . 
S w i f t A: C«». v. ! \ S.. C A 7. I!»(12. iiOS l' .2d 
SIO. See , a l s o . W h i t f i e l d v. S i m p s o n . 1> 
C. l l l .1070. .112 C S u p p . SMI; n Ho v i e v. 
C«»e, I».CI> C.I057. IfiTi F . S u p p . r>M. 
A d n i i n i s i r a t i v e hear i i iKs of N a t i o n a l in u n f a i r l a b o r p r a c t i c e h e a r i i m I n v o l v -
l .nhor KelntiiiiiN Hoard a r e g o v e r n e d b y h , K t a k i n g <d of f l r in l n o t i c e of f i n d i n g s 
t h i s s u b c h a p t e r a n d c h a p l e r 7 of t h i s Ii ,,f f;i, t in pr ior e a s e , w h e r e ( a d s or 
t ie r a t h e r t h a n by F e d e r a l Ut i l e s of Civ i l w h i c h o f f i c i a l n o t i c e h a d b e e n t a k e n hud 
P r o c e d u r e . T i t l e 2.S; but u s u a l a n d n i d i - b e e n f u l l y l i t i g a t e d in n p r o c e e d i n g he -
nary r u l e s of e v i d e n c e a p p l i c a b l e in di.s- t u c . e n t h e s a m e p a r t i e s w i t h s i m i l a r i n -
trict c o u r t s , s o far a s p r a c t i c a b l e , g o v e r n t e r e s t s a n d w e r e nut c o m m o n l y n e c e p l e d 
i t s h e a r i n g s . |{» er T a n n i n g Co. v N. I.. „ r w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d m a t t e r s w h i c h j u d i -
K. !».. C A . « , l'NVi. 27«; K.2d HO. . . r l i o r a r i
 t . i a | n o | i e e u s u a l l y I n v o l v e s . N . h. It. It. 
d e n i e d M S.Ct. ItiUI. 3»»3 C S . K10. 1 L.Kd.
 v . H a r r a h s C l u b . C A.Nev. lOi iS , 403 F .2d 
H I I . O l l i c i i l l n o t i r e 
TJiis s u b c h a p t e r d i d not b a r F e d e r a l 
C o m m u n i c a t i o n ! ) C o n i i i i i ^ i . i i i , in r e - o | \ i n g 
m a j o r m a r k e t h e a r i n g , f r o m t a k i n g n o t i c e 
of f a c t s r e l a t i n g t o t r a n s f e r a p p l i c a t i o n 
for e \ i - l i u g C I 1 F t e l e v i s i o n s t a t i o n Mild 
d i d no t r e q u i r e r e o p e n i n g of r e c o r d be 
c a u s e n o t i c e w a s t a k e n . M i d w e s t T e l e v i -
s i o n . Inc . v. F. C C . 1070. 42H F.2d 1222. 
i:iS C . S . A p p . D . C . 228. 
T h i s s < c l i o n e n t i t l i n g p a r l y w h e n 
n g ' i i i y d e c i s i o n r e d s o n o f f i c i a l n o t i c e of 
f a c t s not a p p e a r i n g In e v i . b nee in r e c o r d 
t o s h o w t o t h e c o n t r a r y w a s n o t v i o l a t e d 
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Note IU(i 
Krr..r. if a n y , of F e d e r a l T r a d e C o n k n o w l e d g e . S o - u a \ . Celcbrc/ . / .e . I M M ' a . 
mis-siMii in t a k i n g . . f l ic ia l not i -e of re. . . rd p.iiit. 2 i l F . S u p p . '-'SO 
l i i i d i n g s ..f a n o i h . r Commissi . .11 pr... . , 
i u g w a s i m m a l e r i a i . w h e r e ( • . . | i .mi - - i"u -
a p p l i c a t i o n of o f f i c i n l h n o l i . . , I mater ia l 
w a s l i m i t e d to an a l l crn . i l iv. h.i-i.- <•/" 
j u r i s d i c t i o n , and j u r i s d i c t i o n w a s s u - t a n . 
a b l e ..ii a n o l h e r bas i s . Safewa.-. S l m e s . 
Inc. v. I . T C . C A W a-li,IO<;<;. J'.l.i: I Jd 
;!'.".. c. r t i o i a r i d e n i e d N7 S r i H..I ;iMi I . 
S 0.T2. 17 I. la l 2.1 Mir.. T|M . p i a . l i . e ..f j u d i c i a l l y n o t i c i n g iu»d 
A . l m i n i - t i;.i ive a c - m - . a n d a g e n c i e s are 
not p r i v i l e g e d lo l a k e j u d i c i a l n o t i c e ..f 
e\ i d e i i n a r v m a t e r i a l w hi. h i-- l e t a mat 
ler «.f , o n i m o i i Know |, , | g e . , m i ,. (.. do .-,, 
d e n i e s (o a l f c e i , . , ! parl.\ the f u n d a u i e i i l a U 
of a rrial . i ."l< u d e i i n i u g v. I . ' ibic .dl . I».C 
Mo PH.J . I'j.'t F S u p p :to| 
Hakintr c o m p a n i e s a p p e a r i n g be fore the 
l-Cderal Trade C o m m i s s i o n <>u pri. «• fix 
l l lg . b a r g e s w o u l d be d e e m e d lo have 
u a l l e x i s a f i e r t h e r e c e p t i o n of e v i d e n c e 
is i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h p r , . \ i - i o u of ( h i s sec 
l i o n that w h e r e a g e m - v d e c i s i o n r e s t s on 
o f f i c ia l n o i i , , . ,,f m a t e r i a l f a c t s u<>l a p -
t r a i y . Id. 
w a i v e d o b j e c t i o n t,, C o m m i s s i o n t a k i n g 
o f l i . i a l n o t . e e of a n o t h e r C i u m i - b . , , I ^ ' r i " ^ ' '" •>'«' ^ i d e m e ,„ t h e record , 
p r o c e e d i n g w h e r e they w e e g i v e n an „,,- : , " v l , : n , v ^ , ! " 1 " " n , , , , , v , , , , ' n ^ ' ,,,% : " 
p o r l u n . t y I., p r o v e f a d s , . , ,!,.. . . . n t r a r y f ' , ^ , , , • , | ! l " " P P - r t u m i y to s h o w t h e c o n -
but fa i l ed to d o so . Id. 
H u e pro.-, , s must be o b s e r v e d in u-e A l f h " i i g h an .•idmiiiisl r a t i v e a g e n c y m a y 
l.v a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a g e n . v of .d f i c i a l m. I""l'«'' lv t a k e o f i n i a l . . . d i c e „f l a d s of 
l i c e . h a v e . . C o r p . v. F. T. C.. C A . U h i n " , | : , , ' ^ l v "«'•«• l^"<»« l e d g e c o i i s i s l m g of 
Haiti. ,'iiiJ F 2d 1MI. g e n e r a l or u n i v e r s a l p r o p o s i t i o n s , il c a n -
not l a k e s u c h n o t i c e of s p e c i f i c proof re-
A d m i n i s l r a t i v e agei icv mus t c o n f i n e ii | a i i n g o n l y to t h e c a s e u n d e r . • o n - i d e r a -
se l f to record be fore it and a f ford o p p , „ -
 ( i l , n : 1 I U , . . s o r t i n g a p a r t i c u l a r pi . .p . .>i 
t u n i l y f o r s h o w i n g s c o n t r a r y f.. m a t e r i a l t ioi i , <>r s e r i e s of | . r o p o s j i j , ,ns | ' S e \ 
( a d s of w h i c h of f ic ia l n o t i c e has been
 n . , lt„UK W i n c n | , v s h a u g h n e s v. I» 
t a k e n N. I.. K. II. v. J o h n s o n . C.A.I5. c'.N. V.IJC^. I Hi F . S u p p . 7 h", 
1J»i52. 310 F.2d 5"J0. 
I te fore a c t i o n <.f a d m i n i s l rat ive a g e n c y •«'»• ITi-NiiinptioiiH 
in t a k i n g o f f i c i a l n o t i c e of m a i l e r s out F e d e r a l d i s t r i c t court m u s t a s s u m e tha t 
s i d e record c a n he held to c o n - M f u l e f., c, ,usf il ut i o n a l r i g h t s of e m p l o y e e s of 
la l e r r o r , a c t i o n must w o r k to s u b s t a n t i a l i v . l e r a l A v i a t i o n A g e n c y | n o w F e d e r a l 
p r e j u d i c e of p a r l y . Id. A v i a t i o n A d m i n i s t rat ion | w o u l d be <1111\ 
a c c o r d e d I In in by o f f i c e r al h e a l i n g <>n 
t h e i r g r i e v a n c e o v e r p e n d i n g t r a n s f e r to 
a m t h e r p l a c e of e m p l o y m e n t a n d by :i | .-
, i a l s o f f i c e r «>n iittv a p p e a l . S p a r k s v. 
a n d o p p o r t u n i t y to reh. i t . F N A Chapter , , , , . , , , . , . . , , A v i ; i f i o „ A g e n . v . 1 >.C 1.;, l!»i;:». .:.».% 
In l e g i s l a t i v e or rule m a k i n g h e a r i n g s , 
s i o p e of o f f i c i a l n o t i c e is . | i : i l e b r o a d , 
l i m i t e d o n l y by e s s e n t i a l s of fa ir n o t i c e 
F . S u p p . IS7.T M i g h t F n g i n e e r s ' Intern . A s s n . A F I . Ci<> 
v N a t i o n a l .Mediation ltd. . I(••".!. 20» I I'd 
OOo. I l l C S A p p . h . C 121. c e r t i o r a r i de -
n i ed S2 S.Ct. 301. 3i!S I S , O.V., 7 F F d J d I 0 6 l » " r d c n of p r o o f 
a s s . In v i e w of f a d that r u l e s of l n l e r s l . i t . • 
C o n i u i c r . e C o m m i s s i o n r e g u l a t i n g l e a s i n g 
In r e a c h i n g the i r d e c i s i o n s , n e i t h e r the of e q u i p m e n t by c e r t i f i c a t e d c a r r i e r s 
c o u r t s n o r a d n i i n i s i r a t i v e b o d i e s s h o u l d w e r e p r o m u l g a t e d p u r s u a n t to M o t o r 
i g n o r e t h e r e a l i t i e s of l i fe a n d d i s r e g a r d C a r r i e r A c t . s e c t i o n iiol ef s e . p of T i t l e 
c o m m o n k n o w l e d g e e v e n t h o u g h s u c h t!», w h i c h d i d not r e q u i r e a record or 
k n o w l e d g e m a y not h a v e a c h i e v e d a p lace h e a r i n g , p r o v i s i o n of t h i s . sect ion t h a i 
w i t h i n t h e p u r v i e w of j u d i c i a l not i ce . p r o p o n e n t of r u l e or o r d e r s h o u l d h a v e 
C o n t i n e n t a l C a n Co. v. I S.. C A 2. IOa!). b i i i d e n of proof , w h e n c o n s i d e r e d w i l l . 
272 F. 2d 312. f o r m e r s e c t i o n l(H»7 | n o w s e c t i o n r.f>7 | of 
t h i s t i t l e t h a i s u c h s e t i on s h o u l d a p p l y 
o n l y w h e n h e a r i n g s w e r e r e q u i r e d by F e d e r a l P o w e r C o m m i s s i o n c o u l d l a k e 
o f f i c i a l notice, of r e p o r t s f i l ed w i t h il by
 s , ) l h „ , . , „ ,„ . I M I „ j , . „ „ , h o n . , . u r , | . , , „ , 
a r e g u l a t e d c o m p a n y . S t a l e of W i s .
 v . x v i ( h , „ r l l l n i l y for ora l h e a r i n g , w a s 
F e d e r a l P o w e r C o m m i s s i o n . !0o2. 201 F 2d i „ „ , , p | i , „ I,,,,,
 # . v r „ if Coniliii .s.sioii b e 
1H3, 01 C . S . A p p . l b C . 307. c e r t i o r a r i d e n i e d , .„ i iKidered n s " p r . q . i n i e n C ' . A m e r i . a n 
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~ 73 S.CI. 307. 311 F S. 20S. 1»7 L.Kd. 337. 
A d m i n i s t r a t i v e a g e n t s a n d a g e n c i e s H e g u l a f i o u of N a t i o n a l T r n n s p o r l a l i on 
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lug under s t a tu te author iz ing issuance of 
airman certificates was valid, ami provi-
sion of this section placing burden of 
proof on proponent of a rule or order 
was inapplicable. Pay v. National 
Transp. Safety lid., C.A.Ca.1909. HI F.2d 
050. 
Iturdeii rested upon Post office Depart -
ment [now Postal Service] as proponent 
of supplemental fraud order to at least 
establish that two products offered for 
sale by appeal ing pJii't.v. firs! of which 
had been banned from mails by initial 
fraud order, were essentially the same 
and weir offered for sale by appeal ing 
party on essentially the same representa-
tions, and with respect to such issues ap-
pealing par ty was entit led to not ire of 
mutters of fact asserted and, if facts as-
serted were in good faith controverted, to 
an oppor tuni ty to submit rebut ta l evi-
dence and conduct cross-examinat ion. 
Kirby v. Shaw, C.A.Ca 1.1000. 358 F.2d 410. 
Provision of this section that , except as 
s tatutes otherwise provide, proponent of 
rule or order shall have burden of proof 
does not operate to require National La-
bor Relations Hoard in back pay pro-
ceeding to introduce evidence of job 
availability at respondents ' plant. N. L. 
It, H. v. Mastro H a s h e s Corp., C.A.N.Y. 
11*05, 354 F.2d 170, cer t iorar i denied 80 S. 
Ct. 1802, 3x1 U.S. 072, 10 L.Ed.2d G\S2. 
Provision of this section that except as 
s tatutes otherwise provide, proponent of 
rule or order shall have burden of proof 
was not intended to d i s tu rb t radi t ional 
allocation of burden of going forward be-
tween part ies to adjudicative proceeding. 
Id. 
It is up to the person a t tacking validi-
ty of a general adminis t ra t ive regulat ion 
or a s ta tute to come forward with facts 
on which he bases his asser t ion of un-
const i tut ionali ty Antonio Koig Sners. S. 
Kn C. v. Sugar lid. of Pue r to Rico, C.A. 
Puerto Kico 1050, 235 F.2d 317, cer t iorar i 
denied 77 S.Ct. 225, 352 U.S. 028, 1 L.Fd. 
2d 102. 
Where National Labor Relat ions Hoard 
fails to establish, its burden of proof bv 
V0,,UiCtVjllL evidence, on issue of . j u r i sduv 
\hm raised by miiou, so tluit court tefus.-
es to enforce Hoard's order as to the un-
ion, but employer files no brief opposing 
the Hoard's order, order will be enforced 
as to~tITe employerT N. L. K. li. v. lia<T 
dock-Engineers , Limited, C A D , 1051, 215 
F.2d 731. 
la hearing to determine whether com-
pany should cease and desist mak ing cer-
tain >resentahons as to effectiveness of 
'<' ' as waterproofing agents , it 
GENERALLY Ch. 5 
was incumbent on Federal T r a d e Com-
mission to prove its charges by compe-
tent, relevant, and substant ia l evidence. 
Concrete Materials Corp. v. Federal T rade 
Commission. C.A.7. 1051, ISO F.2d 350. 
Attempt to shift burden of proof to oil 
companies named as respondents in coin-
plaint filed with Federal Trade Commis-
sion to show that documents covered by 
Commission order requi r ing preservation 
of exis t ing documents was proscribed by 
this suhehapter and chapter 7 of this t i -
tle. Exxon Corp. v. F.T.C., D.C.Del. 1970. 
I l l F.Supp. 1302. 
in contest proceedings a t t ack ing validi-
ty of mining claims, proponent is not 
government but person who ini t iates en-
try into public lauds. Osborne v. 11am-
inil, D.C.New 1901, 377 F.Supp. 077. 
The In te rs ta te Commerce Commission, 
in de termining whether average density 
of certain i tems t r anspor ted by car r ie rs 
war ran ted an increase in classification 
ra t ing , was not obl igated under this sub-
chapter to fix average densi ty of the 
commodit ies at a cer ta in a r i thmet ic fig-
ure, but could ra the r base its decision on 
determinat ion tha t ca r r i e r s had not met 
their burden of proof. Overnite ' l r a n s p . 
Co. v. F. S., DC.Ya.1907, 200 F.Supp. 88. 
E n t r y m a n presen t ing homestead en t ry 
final proof cons t i tu t ing application for 
patent was proponent of rule or order 
for purposes of th is section, and Hurcaii 
of Land Management contest complaint 
had effect of answer , and en t ryman bore 
burden of proof, no twi ths t and ing that 
regula t ions in effect at t ime provided 
that contestant would first present case. 
Stewart v. Penny, D.C.Nev.1905, 238 F. 
Supp. 821. 
When alleged inconsistency of s ta te 
with federal regula t ion is not appa ren t 
on lace of the two commands but hinges 
on tac tual de te rmina t ion , citizen des i r ing 
freedom from s ta te regulat ion does not 
d i scharge his burden by obta in ing letter 
from subord ina te federal official, at least 
when Congress has laid out fact f inding 
procedure as to which s ta te could be giv-
en notice and oppor tun i ty to be heard-
Swift & Co. v. Wiekham, D.C.N. Y.1904, 230 
F .Supp. 308, appeal dismissed 80 S.Ct. 
258, 382 F.S. I l l , 15 L.Kd' id 194. 
Burden of proof res ts upon one who 
files a claim with an admin i s t ra t ive 
agency to es tab l i sh t ha t the required 
condi t ions of e l ig ibi l i ty have been met. 
Ryan v. F lemming , D.C.Mont.1000, 187 F. 
Supp. 055. See. also, Norment Hobby, 
D C.Ala. 1051, 121 F .Supp . 480. 
In suit by motor c unmon car r ie r s to 
enjoin enforcement of In te r s t a t e Com* 
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meree Commission order prescribing rules 
r egu la t ing leasing and interchange of ve-
hicles, record disclosed ample compliance 
with all requi rements of this section in-
c lud ing that of burden of proof on pro-
ponents of rules. Eas te rn Motor Fxp. v. 
F. S., D.C.Ind.1952, 103 F.Supp. 001, af-
firmed 73 S.Ct. 307. 344 F.S. 208, 07 L.Fd. 
337, rehear ing denied 73 S.Ct. 038, 345 F. 
S. 013, 07 L.Ed. 1317. 
H u rden of proof is on proponent of 
rule or order in adminis t ra t ive proceed-
ings. Schramm v. Physical Therapis t s 
Examin ing Hd.. D.C.App.1000. 210 A.2d 
840, affirmed 304 F.2d 072, 120 F.S A pp. 
D.C. 317. cer t iorar i denied SS S.Ct. 11*1, 
300 U.S. 087, 10 L.Ed.2d 1280. 
107. Admissibi l i ty of evidence—Generally 
Adminis t ra t ive agencies like Federal 
T r a d e Commission are not restricted by 
r igid rules of evidence, and rules bar r ing 
certain types of evidence in criminal or 
quasi -cr iminal cases are not controlling. 
Federal T rade Commission v. Cement In-
s t i tu te , 1048. 08 S.Ct. 703, 333 F.S. 083, 92 
L.Ed. 1009, rehear ing denied 08 S Ct. 1102, 
334 U.S. 830, 92 L.Ed. 1701. See, also, 
Concrete Materials Corp. v. Federal Trade 
Commission, C.A.7, 1051, 189 F.2d 359. 
Under section 43a of Title 41 making 
appl icable to wage determinat ions under 
Walsh-I lea ley Act, section 35 ct seq. of 
Ti t le 41, the provisions of this subchapter 
and chapte r 7 of this t i t le, admission of 
wage tables compiled by Secretary of La-
bor from confidential replies without 
product ion of under ly ing data to protest-
ing indus t ry members failed to accord 
r ight of rebut ta l and cross-examination 
prescribed by Congress. Wirtz v. Haldor 
Elec. Co., 1903, 337 F.2d 518. 110 U S A pp. 
D.C. 122. 
Technical rules for exclusion of evi-
dence in j u r y t r ia ls do not apply in pro-
ceedings before federal adminis t ra t ive 
agencies, in absence of s ta tu tory require-
ment tha t such rules a re to be observed. 
Khodes r h a n n a c a l Co. v. Federal Trade 
Commission, C.A.7, 1954, 208 F.2d 382, 
modified on other g r o u n d s 75 S.Ct. 301, 
348 U.S. 040, 09 L.Ed. 730. See, also, In-
g ram v. Gardner, D.CMiss.1009, 295 F. 
Supp. 380. 
Evidence, which would be excluded in 
an o rd inary lawsuit , may. under many 
circumstances , be received on hearings 
before an adminis t ra t ive agency. Rhodes 
Pharmaca l Co. v. Federal Trade Commis-
sion, C.A.7, 1954, 208 F.2d 382, modified 
on other g rounds 75 S.Ct. 301, 348 U.S. 
940, 99 L.Ed. 730. 
Common law exclusionary rules of evi-
dence are not based on const i tut ional in-
terdict ions and are not applicable to ad-
minis t ra t ive proceedings, even of judicial 
character , in absence of s ta tu tory re-
qui rement . Willapoint Oysters v. Ewing, 
C.A.9. J049, 174 F.2d 070, cer t iorar i denied 
70 S.Ct. 101, 33N U.S. 800, 91 L.Ed. 527, re-
hear ing denied 70 S.Ct. 703, 330 U.S. 945, 
01 L Ed. 1300. 
In absence of a specific s ta tu te , admin 
istrat ive bodies are not bound by rigidly 
exclusionary common law rules of evi-
dence. Smith v. (,'eneral Truck Drivers, 
Warehousemen and Helpers Union Local 
1(57 of San Hernardino and Itiverside 
Counties, D.C.Cal.1900, 181 F.Supp. 14. 
108. Beat evidence rule 
Where issue in proceeding before Inter-
s ta te Commerce Commission was whether 
notice has been given in compliance with 
s ta tute , and contents of document were 
not in issue, copies of let ters sent to par-
ty were admiss ible over "bes t evidence." 
objection. Clearfield Cheese Co. v. II. S., 
D.C.Mo.1909, 308 F.Supp. 1072. 
109. Exper t te&tiinony 
So long as an admin i s t r a t ive agency is 
not a rb i t r a ry , it has some discretion in 
de te rmin ing whether to admi t exper t evi-
dence. (Jeorgia Ass'n of Independent Ins. 
Agents v. Hoard of Governors of Federal 
Keserve System, C.A.Ca. 1970, 533 F.2d 224. 
Ship doctor ' s test imony to purser ' s ca-
pacity to commit homosexual act was ad-
missible as expert opinion in proceeding 
to revoke purse r ' s licenses, where doctor 
testified to psychia t r ic t r a in ing and expe-
rience and to incidents as basis for his 
opinion, despi te doctor 's claimed admis-
sion that he was not an exper t . O'Kon 
v. Koland, D.C.N. Y. 1905, 245 F.Supp. 743. 
110. Hearsay 
Use of hearsay in an adminis t ra t ive 
proceeding is proper . School Hd. of Hro-
ward County, F lor ida v. Depar tment of 
Heal th, Ed. and Welfare, U. S. Office of 
Ed., C.A.Fia.1970, 525 F.2d 900. 
There was no e r ro r in admiss ion of 
hearsay tes t imony at admin i s t r a t i ve hear 
ing. Marvin T r a g a s h Co., Inc. v. U. S. 
Dept. of Agr., C.A.FIa.1975, 524 F.2d 1255. 
Hearsay is admiss ib le in admin is t ra t ive 
proceedings, whhdi need not s t r ic t ly fol-
low conventional ilea of evidence; tests 
for admissibil i ty re fundamenta l fair-
ness and probat uess. Martin-Mcndoza 
v. Immigra t ion J Natura l iza t ion Serv-
ice, C.A.9, 197' 409 F.2d 918, cert iorari 
denied 95 S ' ' : ! ' S »»'" r 
M.S UNITED STATES CIIH'VIT COURT, [April 
M:ixli<:li| v. Levy. 
generally, for tl.e defendants; and that in Colbroith d' Co. v. fr<m*/ht, 
the verdict woiil.l have been for the plaintiffs, l,ut with only .six pence dam! 
*'J2\t] AT1UL TKKM, 1707. 
1'resent—IHI-;I»KJ,L, .Justice, ami J'i:ri:ns, District Judge . 
SMYTH K V. HANKS. 
J^'tn/ft/t* of -inilnt'sx. 
A « i r „ e « is | M i v i ! , ^ l from anosf, flir ;i , , , ,„ , ,„ , , , , , . t i l m . ,„ , r c f ( , r , -s (, 
r.-n»r„ to Lis „.„,„., as u d l as ,1mm:; h i , aciual ,Ue . , l : , .uv „,..,„ the , ou , t . 
f'.M'iAS. The defendant was a resident of Virginia, and had been sub-
pu'naed as a witness in the ease „f ,S',W* L-wv x. Irrhu; whieh was 
parked or (rial at the present I m n , IMII was continued on the 20th of 
April JI,. was arrested on the L'Oth <>( April ; and the following dav, Lwu 
i»'»v'-l. that he should he discharged from the arrest and process, on account 
<»l the privilege o! a witness, c,„„/o, vammdo t( rokundo. 4 Com. Di-r 
»M> ; "J Str. lu:>4, iiHO ; Vin. Ahr., tit. Triv. °* 
JJv Tin: COURT.—The witness is, undoubledlv, privileged from arrest 
lor a reasonable time, to prepare for his departure, and return to his home 
as well as d u n n g his actual attendance upon the court. Ji.u the privilege 
does not extend throughout the term at which the cause is marked fur tr ial-
nor will it protect him, while the witness is engaged in transacting his gen! 
<*™l private, business, after he is discharged from the obligation of the sub-
l><iiul. ° 
* ^ ° ] ^'AlAxrn-xn's Lessee v. LEVY.(a) 
T H E SAMK V. T I I K SAMI;. 
Jiu'ixtltttion. 
. 1 ^ . 1 " i i . ' • M , " « ! " " , ' " " " ' " " " l ° i v " u j , , r i * i i , - , i " 1 ' ; i"" 1 "«•• • " " " »•!».»«'"•<**.. , 
TllH j l l . i - , l i , l i „„ „I ;, f „ | , , r ; | | t . „ , 1 ) t J, , „ , , l>riuirij-lla-t. ( ,c . ,„., , , | i , ,„( ^„ . t . ; . 1 | 
T I I K oj.h.ioii of tin. Court was «leliv.-r.-.l in tl.is «aso, in tl,,. following 
terms : ' 'b 
I I I K I ^ M . , Justice.—A motion was made for a rule to show cause why 
these ejectments should not be dismissed, upon an allegation that it 
appeared, by an answer to a bill in equity, for a discovery; in this court, 
m J l t ' . ? 1 ^ ^ l h i s c j " '* c ^ given in 2 Dull. «S1 ; but I comply with the sub*,. 
ami the b.ii),
 n puhhshin- the opinion of the court at 1/n-e. 
not (- l i l ill Hr , C X W U l f ' n " ' I I? , '1 ,US , J ° f « i v i , , s J u , i s d k t i ™ t 0 * Mcral court, will not .uail in llu.t respect. llujsfa Lessee e. McNeil, 1 \V\ 0. 0 70 
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brought bv the lefendants in these ejectments, a«_rainst the lessor of the 
plainlilV, that they are iu n-ality the suits of a eiti/«n »»f this state (viz., 
Samuel W'allis), t hough under the name of a citizen of another state, to 
whom it i> alh g< d ronveyanees \ \ i |v made, without any eousidoratioii, lor 
the sole purpose of making him a nominal h-ssnr of the plainlilV in these 
ejeetnuMJts. A rule to show eause was granted, and, up<«u I he da\ appointed, 
the ease W;H fully hoard and argue Ion both sides, the proceedings in eouity 
on the bill ft ii* a discovery having b.-eu e\hibited t«> the court and read. 
The importance of t\n> presen! n^ie-lion is evident, bceau^i1 it coiie.erns 
the const ii uiion and laws of the Tinted States, in a point highly essential to 
their welfare, to wit, the proper boundaries between the authority of a sin-
gle slate, and that of the Tinted States. This, not only tin* constitution 
itself has been anxious to ascertain, by precise and particular definitions, but. 
the congress, in carrying info r/l'ecl that part of the constitution which 
concerns the judiciary, has been solicitous to preserve with tin* greatest 
caution. The strong instance of (his is a provision in l]n' judicial act, to 
the following elVecf: 
' •That no district or circuit court shall have cognisance of any suit to re-
cover the contents of any pmmissorv note, or other cAo.s-f hi <t<-fi<>>t^ in favor 
of an assignee, unless a suit might have been prosecuted in such court to 
recover the said contents, if no assignment had been made, except incases 
of foreign bills of exchange/ ' (1 T. S. Stat. 70, < 11.) 
This I adduce as a strong instance to show the solicitude of congress on 
this subject, for the rc*rul;il'u>n extend* lo a b»mi jhfi'. assignment in the 
instances specified, a^ well as to one ))m!<i /'Vc ; but the provision goes to 
all, more elVectually to prevent any practices of deception by means of the? 
latter. 
^Nothing is more evident, than if this be a controversy between r * , n , 
citizens of different states, it is a controversy determinable iu this --
court, and of which, ther* fore, the court must, sustain jurisdiction. On the 
other hand, if it be not a controversy between citizens of different states, 
but between citizens of the same state, it not being one of those eases which 
entitle citizens of the same state to any exercise of jurisdiction by this court 
it ought not to be determined here. J>ut if it shall appear, from a consider-
ation of the facts, that this is not a case which the lessor of the plaint ill* was 
entitled to bring into this court, it will still remain to be impiired, whether 
the remedy pursued on the present occasion is proper. 
Tin* first question, therefore, \<, whether it sulVuiently appears to the 
court, that this is a conlnner^y subsisting bet ween citizens of the same state, 
and not between citizens of dilVerent slates, so as to authorize a dismissal 
of the suit, in ease the remedy be iu point of law a proper one? The evi-
dence, upon which the charge is alleged, is an answer to a bill tiled in the 
equity side1 of this court, by the defendants in the ejectments, in order to 
obtain a discovery by the oath of the lessor of the plainlilV. This is admitted 
to be competent evidence, on a question at law, and therefore (supposing 
the method of proceeding iu other respects proper), I am only to consider, if 
it affords satisfactory evidence of the facts suggested : 
The facts admitted by the answer, in substance, are these : T h a t there 
wen; certain applications to the Jand-ollice (if this state, for 01 tracts of 
land, in the county of Lu/.erue, containing -'7,M)U acres : Tliut the applica-
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t ions were ina<lo (as t he r e s p o n d e n t has been i n f o r m e d a n d be l i eves ) b y and 
for I lie iiM'of S a m u e l W a l l is, of t In* emu it y of N o r t h u m b e r l a n d in th i s s l a t e : 
T h a t in Apr i l I 7 M , c o n v e y a n c e s w h e r e e x e c u t e d to Mav l ' n ld , tin1 p r e s e n t 
lessor of t he plaint ill', hy whieh t h e I 'gal t i t le to t ho l a n d s I he re in d e s e r i h e d 
was c o u v e v o d a n d a s s igned to Maxt ic ld , as he a p p r c h e m h a n d he l i eves . T h a t 
Maxl ic ld paid no c o n s i d e r a t i o n , e i t h e r p e c u n i a r ) , or of a n y o t h e r n a t u r e , for 
t he l.in<Js, and t h e r e f o r e , he a p p r e h e n d s and he l ieves , tha t t h e e q u i t a b l e t i t l e 
is in Samue l W a l l i s . T h a t . Maxl ic ld c o n s e n t e d to s t a n d t h e t r u s t e d of (ho 
l a n d s for tin; use and henetit of W a l l i s , and left t h e m a n a g e m e n t , d i r ec t ion 
and p ro -ecu t imi of tin; bus ines s to W a l l i s , b y w h o s e d i r ec t ion .Maxlield 
a p p r e h e n d s and hel ieves , tha t t h e <u(rntts m e n t i o n e d in t h e c o m p l a i n a n t ' s 
bill were tiled, and all subsequen t p roceed ing . ; had . 
In c o m p a r i n g t h e facts t h u s a d m i t t e d , wi th t h e bill he w a s ca l led u p o n to 
answer , it is r e r y r e m a r k a b l e , tha t the las t i n t e r r o g a t o r y was e x p r e s s e d in 
such p a r t i c u l a r a n d po in t ed t e r m s , that if it had been d i r e c t l y a n d pos i t ive ly 
*•»•(•» I : m s u v r ( , < l > it would h a v e 1 :been dec i s ive one w a y or t h e o t h e r . l>ut it 
is not so a n s w e r e d , and his own counsel n o w o b j e c t , t ha t he d id no t 
a n s w e r d i r o - t l v to tin? q u e s t i o n , and t h e r e f o r e , t h e on ly r e m e d y was to 
except I a n s w e r for insuj l ic iency, a n d c o m p e l a b e t t e r a n s w e r . T h i s 
ob jec t ion , I t h i n k , m a y he easi ly o b v i a t e d by t h e fo l l owing c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . 
M . If t h e q u e s t i o n h a d been an i m p r o p e r one , it m i g h t h a v e been de-
m u r r e d to . l>v t h a t no t b e i n g d o n e , i t is confessed tlr.it t h e q u e s t i o n was 
p rop r, and of cou r se , it o u g h t to h a v e been a n s w e r e d . A n d it is l i t t l e s l ior t 
of an insult on t h e c o u r t , n o w , to tell i t , t h a t t h e lessor of t h e plaint iff pur -
posely dec l ined a n s w e r i n g a q u e s t i o n fa i r ly put to h i m , w h i c h lie m i g h t and 
o ' igh : to h a v e a n s w e r e d , b u t by h is no t d o i n g it he n o w se t s t h e c o u r t a t 
def iance. 
2d. if, for w a n t of a fu l le r a n s w e r , no e v i d e n c e w a s b e f o r e the; c o u r t , t he 
ob jec t ion iniLfht poss ib lv be of w e i g h t . JJut all t h e o t h e r f ac t s a d m i t t e d b y 
the a n s w e r a r e opan to all p r o p e r in fe rences , as wel l s u c h as a r i s e f r o m t h i s 
wilful and insolent omiss ion , as f rom any o t h e r p a r t of t h e ease . ' j ' hc o b j e c t 
was to effect a d i s c o v e r y , w h e t h e r c e r t a i n c o n v e y a n c e s w e r e a c t u a l l y g i v e n 
fur t h e sole p u r p o s e of e v a d i n g t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l imi t s , a s t o j u r i s d i c t i o n , 
p r e s c r i b e d t o th i s c o u r t . S u c h a d e s i g n cou ld be e x p e c t e d o n l y t o bo dis-
closed bv d i r e c t confess ion , o r a n u m b e r of c o n c u r r i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s . 
:<d. It does not a p p e a r , tha t he will e v e r g i v e a b e t t e r a n s w e r . H e m a y 
choo>e to g o t h r o u g h all t h e p rocesses <>f c o n t e m p t for n o t a n s w e r i n g su(!i-
c ien t ly , as In; a p p a r s a l r e a d y to h a v e d o n e , for no t a n s w e r i n g a t a l l . H o 
m a y even s u b m i t t o p e r p e t u a l i m p r i s o n m e n t . I s t h e ca se n e v e r t o bo 
dec ided , un t i l he t h i n k s tit t o c o n s e n t , it shal l b e ? 
4 t h . T h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of l his_f,,-»11 ^1__J2L_'^L-Jiil''—iI-«^^"^--JS^"?r-al»--?>"^ 
special.JJiJ~ A m a n m u s t a s s ign a g o o d reason for c o m i n g h e r e . If t h e fac t 
IsTciucJ", u p o n wliicli~Iic g r o u n d s his r i g h t to c o m e h e r e , h e m u s t p r o v e it, 
(Vi» The courts of the United States have jurisdiction in a case between the citizens 
of the same state, if the plaintiM' is only a nominal plaiutilf, for the use of an alien. 
Jirowne v. Strode, 5 Cr. an:{. If a citizen of one stateshould remove into another state, 
with a l>ond jhle intention of abandoning his former place of residence, he may maintain 
an action in the circuit court of the state which he has abandoned ; although it should 
appeal-, that his only motive was to enable him to bring a suit in a court of the United 
flutes. Lessee of Cooper r. Galbraith, «J W. C C 051. ^  
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l i e , t h e r e f o r e , is t h e a c t o r i i M h e ju*oof j a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y , lie h a s n o r i g h t , 
w h e r e t h e point is c o n t e s t e d , to t h r o w the touts j*/'o?ntmli' on t h e d e f e n d a n t . 
A s th is , u n d o u b t e d l y , is i ho g e n e r a l p r inc ip le , I see no reason t o d e p a r t from 
it, on t he p resen t occas ion , when the k n o w l e d g e of all t he c i r c u m s t a n c e s o( 
t he case is i u l l s po>M s-ed by the lessor of t h e plaint itY, a n d he is r e g u l a r l y 
cal led upon to disclose f hem. hoi t h e e reasons , I a m r l e a r l v of op in ion , t h a t 
Max l i e ld ' s f o r b e a r i n g to g ive a fuller answer , is no r eason for m y not weigh-
ing t h e a m o u n t of the a n s w e r , which he has t h o u g h t p r o p e r to g i v e ; and 
c o n s i d e r i n g w h e t h e r it .-ullicienlly es tab l i shes t h e a l l e g a t i o n s of t h e d e f e n d -
a n t s in t hese c a u s e - . 
I oil it is o b j e c t e d , tha t M a x l i e l d ' s an swer , t h o u g h e v i d e n c e aga ins t h im , 
is no e v i d e n c e a g a i n s t Wal l i s , w h o is said t^ be t h e ct.ifui </"<' trust, a n d 
Maxl ie ld a b a r e t r u s t e e . *Ans\vor : p p o n t h e face of t he se e ject - i+.,.,.. 
inei i ts , W a l l i s ' s n a m e n o w h e r e a p p e a r s . Maxl i e ld , t h e r e f o r e , is th..* *• 
on ly pe r son to be cons ide red here , if inrstni<]HC (ru<t ha s a r igh t t<> s u p p o r t 
an e j e c t m e n t , b u t is for -vd , upon legal p r inc ip l e s , to use t h e n a m e of his 
t r u s t e e , he m u s t t a k e t he consequences . T h i s c o u r t , as a cour t of law, c a n n o t 
p u n i s h t h e t r u s t e e for a b reach of t r u s t , t h o u g h in a n o t h e r c a p a c i t y it m a y . 
J J u t y f it had been m a t e r i a l | o h a v e m a d e W a l l i s a p a r t y , a g r e a t , if not an 
i n s u p e r a b l e d i l l ieu l ty has been a l l eged in d o i n g it. W a l l i s a n d l!." d e f e n d -
a n t s b e i n g c i t i zens of t h e s ame s t a t e , it is v e r y d o u b t f u l , w h e t h e r a bill ii. 
e q u i t y w o u l d h a v e lain aga ins t W a l l i s , in th i s c o u r t , t h o u g h it was m e r e l y 
i nc iden t a l to t h e sui t a t law. IJut it is c lear , t h a t t h e o b j e c t i o n in t h i s case 
is m e r e l y f r ivolous , because , upon t h e let urn of t h e ru le to s h o w c a u s e , an e.i: 
}>'trt>' a l l idav i t m igh t be p r o d u c e d . Wa l l i s ' s a l l idav i t , u n d o u b t e d l y , m i g h t 
h a v e been , as well as a n y o the r s . W h y has it n o t been ? N o r eason h a s 
been a s s i g n e d , to show it could not be d o n e , o r t ha t h e d e s i r e d , o r t h a t h is 
counse l wished , he shou ld do it. N o r has t i m e been so l i c i t ed for his p u t t i n g 
in such an a l l idav i t , t h o u g h it is so se r ious ly a l l e g e d , t h a t it was h i g h l y 
i m p o r t a n t to h im to have had an o p p o r t u n i t y of a n s w e r i n g th i s c h a r g e . 
It is a l l eged , that Mavl ic ld was a t r u s t e e , a n d as such a u t h o r i z e d t o 
c o m e in to th i s cou r t . A t r u s t e e ! lo r what p u r p o s e ? T h e r e is not t h e least, 
s h a d o w of e v i d e n c e , t ha i he was a t r u s t e e for a n y o t h e r p u r p o s e , t h a n t h a t 
W a l l i s shou ld h a v e a co lo r for s u i n g in th i s c o u r t , in his n a m e . T h e deed 
is not even s l a h a l t o h a v e been d e l i v e r e d . N o fair objec t of t h e t r u s t is 
specified. W a l l i s l ived in P e n n s y l v a n i a ; t h e l and lies in P e n n s y l v a n i a ; 
Max t i ch l l ived in D e l a w a r e . W h a t was he to d o ? It a p p e a r s , f rom his o w n 
a c k n o w l e d g m e n t , t h a t h e has d o n e n o t h i n g h i t h e r t o , n o r d o e s h e s t a t e h e was 
to d o a n y t h i n g . 
I Ju t it is sa id , a m a n is not ob l iged to specif)' ' a n y o b j e c t of a t r u s t , l i e 
m a y c r e a t e a t r u s t f rom m e r e wh im. A d m i t t e d : J»ut t h e law c a n n o t , w i th -
ou t a b s u r d i t y , pe rmi t a man to c r e a t e a t ru s t , for t h e p u r p o s e of d e f e a t i n g a 
so lemn p rov i s ion of i ls o w n . N o t h i n g cou ld be m o r e r i d i c u l o u s t h a n s u c h 
a p r inc ip l e . W h e n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n has g u a r d e d , w i t h t h e u t m o s t s o l i c i t u d e , 
a g a i n s t t h e exe rc i se of a p a r t i c u l a r a u t h o r i t y , so as t h a i , u n d e r c e r t a i n 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s , o n e m a n shall no t sue a n o t h e r in a c o u r t c r e a t e d u n d e r 
it , c a n s u c h a c o u r t for a m o m e n t s u p p o r t a d o c t r i n e , t h a t i t sha l l b e in t h e 
p o w e r of s u c h a m a n , by a n y c o n t r i v a n c e , e x p r e s s l y c a l c u l a t e d to ' d e f e a t 
th i s o b j e c t , to r e n d e r it. whol ly n u g a t o r y ? T h i s , i n d e e d , w o u l d be t o r e n d e r 
the l aws of o u r c o u n t r y a farce ; to m a k e the c o n s t i t u t i o n a m e r e s h a d o w ; 
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and d e s e r v e d l y t o d r a w upon t h o s e e n t r u s t e d wi th i ts e x e c u t i o n , an o d i u m 
which has heen i n d u s t r i o u s l y , hut I h o p e will e v e r he in va in , a t h - i n p t e d . 
* -
 :1
 l o l l il is s a i d , f l i c s \ s t e m o f lictioii*-; i« n o t n e w ; a n d :iil a t t e m p t 
* ' ' ' J , ; l s heeii g r a v e l y m a d e , to i nduee th i s cinir!, hy llatt< r i n g c \ pi ess ions, 
to a d d to the list of l ie t ions in hei ug , one of its o w n , in t h e fa< f t h e con-
s t i t u t i on we a r e - s w o r n to s u p p o r t , a n d hy e v e r y o l h e r s ac red lie, h o u n d to 
ma in t a in inv io la t e . It is t r u e , t h e e o u r l s of law in K n g l a n d h a v e coun te -
nanced a n d s u p p o r t e d some lie! ions. S u c h ( l o r inst anee ) as a line and re-
cove ry , and an e j i c t men t : and Mill m o r e except i onah ly , f ict ions to U'IVC a 
j u r i sd i c t i on , w h i c h o t h e r w i s e cou ld not he m a i n t a i n e d . It is siitlieieiit to say 
of all t hese , tha t t h e y o r i g i n a l l y took p lace , w h e n ve ry d a r k n o t i o n s of law 
and l i h e i t y w e r e e n t e r t a i n e d ; tha t t hey a re s u p p o r t e d now s«d« Iv on the 
a u t h o r i t y of l o n g u s a g e ; and tha t no <-oiirl would now d a r e to set up a n e w 
one . N o cour t in A m e r i c a e v e r yet t h o u g h t , nor , 1 h o p e , e v e r will, of 
a c q u i r i n g j u r i s d i c t i o n hy a l ic t ion. A n d t h e only I 'ut ion e v e r in g e n e r a l use 
jn A m e r i c a ( p e r h a p s , w i t h a few e x c e p t i o n s as to l ines .and reeoyer j c s j , 
I he l i eve , \\as heen that, of p r o c e e d i n g hy e j e c t m e n t , w h i c h is a m e r e form 
of ac t ion , a n d so modif ied a s t t o d o no poss ih l c i n j u r y . I t c a n n o t .sub-
s t a n t i a l l y a i l e d a n y m a n ' s r ight w h a t e v e r . 
In o r d e r t o - e n c o u r a g e t h e c o m t to c o u n t e n a n c e th i s s c h e m e , it is naid, 
tha t no i n j u r y can ar ise from th i s p r a c t i c e , heeause t h e dec i s ion in t h i s c o u r t 
will h«» oj» t h e «:!!!!" p r i redp ies , and it is In he p r e s u m e d , w i t h an equa l 
r e g a r d to j u s t i ce , in th i s c o u r t , a s in a s t a t e c o u r t . If a s e r i o u s a n s w e r to 
such an o h s e r v a t i o n is r e q u i r e d , it is su re ly e v i d e n t , t h a t w e a r e n o t to as-
s u m e a v o l u n t a r y j u r i s d i c t i o n , heeause , we t h i n k , o r a n y o t h e r s m a y t h i n k , 
it m a y .l»e exe rc i s ed i n n o c e n t l y , o r even wise ly . T h e cour t is not t o fix t he 
h o u n d s of i ts o w n ju r i sd ic t ion , a c c o r d i n g to i ts o w n d i s c r e t i o n . ^ ^ i u r j ^ i ! c . ' r 
t ion a s s u m e d w i t h o u t a u t h o r i t y , w o u l d he e q u a l l y a n u s u r p a t i o n , whetherr 
•exercised wise ly o r u n w i s e ! / . l>ut t h e fact a s s u m e d c a n n o t he a d m i t t e d to 
he t r u e . If t h i s court, exerc i se a ju r i sd ie t ion in such a ease , il m a y d o .so, 
.after all a v e n u e s t«» a s t a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n a re for e v e r c l o s e d : tha t is a l l eged 
t o he t h e fact, in t h e p resen t i n s t a n c e . T h e r e a r e a lso o t h e r d i lTercnees , such 
as r e g a r d t h e p lace of t r ia l , t h e v e n u e of t he j u r o r s , a n d o t h e r c i r c u m s t a n c e s 
o m i t t e d to he m e n t i o n e d , h e e a u s e th i s p a r t of t h e case is t oo p la in t o r e q u i r e 
a n y formal d i scuss ion . 
O n th i s occas ion , it m a y h e m a t e r i a l to c o n s i d e r w h e t h e r , cm t h e fac ts now 
appa ren t to t h e c o u r t , Maxl icM h a s a n y t i t l e , e i t h e r in e q u i t y o r a t law , 
h e e a u s e , if he has no t , it is e v i d e n t , t h e t i t l e t o he c o n t e s t e d must, h e W a l -
lisV, a n d no t his ; a n d of c o u r s e , t h e s u h j e c t - m a t t e r to he d e c i d e d , is a t i t l e 
in q u e s t i o n h e t w e u u t w o c i t i z ens of t h e s a m e s t a t e . 
1st. A s to e q u i t y . H e has n o n e , hy his o w n a c k n o w l e d g m e n t ; h e pa id 
no c o n s i d e r a t i o n ; h e is t o p e r f o r m no d u t y ; h e o n l y p e r m i t s h is n a m e 
*•«•{•- I **° 'M* USt ,< '» * ° r * m > s , , l , l , o l ' t °* :v l , a , , , l on t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e 
cour t ; a p u r p o s e w h i c h a c o u r t of e q u i t y w o u l d re jec t w i t h t h e h i g h -
est d i sda in . 
2d. A s l i t t l e , in m y o p i n i o n , can h e s u p p o r t a n y t i t l e a t l a w . 1st. Con-
s ider th is a s a m e r e h a r g a i n a n d sa le . A h a r g a i n a n d sa le is of n o va l id i ty , 
w h e r e no m o n e y h a s heen pa id . N o t h i n g g i v e s a l ega l t i t l e u n d e r t h e ac t of 
H e n . V I I I . ( c o n c e r n i n g uses) w h i c h w a s n o t a n c q u i t a h l e o n e h e f o r e t h a t 
Btatute . A l t h a t titn*k, n o b a r g a i n e e c o u l d h a v e c o m p e l l e d a b a r g a i n o r to 
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Convey, w h o had r e c e i w d no m o n e y : t he r e fo re , s ince t h e s f a t u t e . n o use 
can a r i se on such a <\i nl. wi thou t some m o n e y to s u p p o r t it. ~d. A l l o w i n g 
the h ighes t Hlieacv to this
 t\r\<\. u n d e r ihe act of a s sc inh ly . T h i s can on ly 
m e a n , that w h a t a man « in lawful ly g r a n t , hy any form ol co in v \ a m . . sha l l 
he sul l ic iei i t lv g r a n t e d in this form. Of coui.se, if u n d e r a u v o t h e r form <>f 
c o n v e y a n c e , o w i n g to technica l dillicult ics, such a p u r p o s e cou ld succeed , 
w i thou t r e d r e s s a deed , professedly a h a r g a i u and sale, is not to h a v e its 
in l lucnce e x t e n d e d , mere ly thai an i l legal p u r p o s e shou ld u k e c l l V c l , u n d e r 
color of fo rm. T h e intent of t he act c e r t a i n l y was, that t h e want i>\' form 
shou ld not defea t t h e in t en t ion of an hones t , hut unski l fu l c o n v e y a n c e ; hut 
sure ly not to s m o o t h tie- pa th of in jus t ice , hy c o n v e r t i n g a righM'ul e s t a t e 
i n to a w r o n g f u l one . ad. Hut a d m i t t i n g it to he any form of c o n v e y a n c e 
you please , t h e n I >av, that a court of law will not , a n y m o r e than court of 
e q u i t y , s u p p o r t a i\v\>{\ formal ly good , hut s u h s t a n t i ; d l \ f i audu le i i t . A n d 
"whether t h e f raud he of a mora l n a t u r e , for t h e p u r p o s e of d o i n g a willed 
in jus t ice , or t h e act he, as the l a w y e r s t e r m it, in j'r>n<</< m h>jis (I hat is, to 
e v a d e s o m e l a w ) , t h e law will equa l ly i n t e r p o s e , to p r even t i ts o w n p r inc i -
ples from hi ' ing m a d e m e r e i n s t r u m e n t s to defeat its o w n p u r p o s e s . 
T h e r e is no a c t in law, wi th in m v reco l lec t ion , which f raud will nor, 
v i t i a t e . It will v i t i a t e a feoll 'ment, which is a very strict co in e\ anee . i cqu i r -
ing no c o n s i d e r a t i o n , a n d passes hy an a c t u a l l ivery . Il will \ i l i a t e a line, 
t h o u g h a so l emn t ram-act ion in a cour t of j u s t i c e , a n d pecu l i a r ly f avored . !' 
will even depr ive*a par t y of the heiiettt of a j u d g m e n t d c l i h e r a l e l y g iven . 
C o n v e y a n c e s to defeat c r ed i t o r s ( h o w e v e r fo rmal ly a g r e e a h l e to law) a r e 
held a h s o l u t e l y void, at least as aga ins t t h e m . So a lso , in t h e c o m m o n ca<e 
of u s u r y , for which so m a n y c o n t r i v a n c e s h a v e heen d e v i s e d . N o eont r iv-
anec , no color , no form w h a t e v e r , can p r o t e c t a n y t r a n s a c t i o n , wh ich rea l ly 
a p p e a r s to h a v e heen usur ious , from h c i n g d e c l a r e d so. 
T h e ^ p l i c a t i o n of these p r inc ip les is ohvio i i s . If (as I o h s e r v e d h- fore) , 
t h e deed in ques t i on is to he c o n s i d e r e d as a m e r e h a r g a i n a n d sale , it is 
a h s o l u t e l y void for want of a legal c o n s i d e r a t i o n ( w h i c h must he m o n e y 
a lone) to s u p p o r t *it. If it is to he c o n s i d e r e d as a n y ot ln r k i n d of J - . J . . . 
c o n v e y a n c e , i t h a v i n g no c o n s i d e r a t i o n w h a t e v e r hid, a n i l legal o n e 
( tha t of d e f e a t i n g t he c o n s t i t u t i o n and l aws o{ t h e I ' l i i l ed S l a t e s in a most 
essent ia l p o i n t ) , it is at h a s t void as to tha t p u r p o s e , a n d , t h e r e f o r e , doc*, not 
a u t h o r i z e jMaxlichl to c o m e in to th i s c o u r t , i , t h e r e f o r e , c o n c l u d e , w i t h o u t 
d i i l icu l ty , t h a t iMaxliehl has n e i t h e r a legal no r an cqu i tah le . t i t l e t>> a u t h o r i z e 
him to c o m e in to this c o u r t . 
T h e on ly r e m a i n i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n is, as to t h e r e m e d y , w h i c h , f rom t h e 
l irst , was t h e on ly d i i l i cu l ty I found . I will v e n t u r e t o lay i t d o w n as an 
u n q u e s l i o n a h l e p r inc ip l e , t h a t no g r i e v a n c e r a n a r i se in t h e l aw, hu t s o m e 
r e m e d y m a y h e app l i ed to it. T h e p r e s e n t g r i e v a n c e , t h e r e f o r e ( w h i c h , if 
u n r e d r e s s e d , wil l , in a n y case like t h e p r e s e n t , e n a h l e t w o p e r s o n s , a t t h e i r 
p l ea su re , to d o in jus t i ce to a t h i r d , a n d force th i s c o u r t t o e x e r c i s e a j u r i s -
d ic t ion n e v e r d e l e g a t e d to i t ) , must a d m i t of s o m e r e m e d y . 
O n l y t h r e e h a v e heen s u g g e s t e d , in t h e p r e s e n t s t a g e of t h e p r o c e e d i n g . 
1st. T h e m e t h o d n o w u n d e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n . ~*\. A plea t o t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n . 
3d. A n i n j u n c t i o n in e q u i t y , I will c o n s i d e r t h e last t w o lir.-d ; for if t hey 
are r c m o \ ed o u t of t h e way (as I t h ink t h e y m u s t h e ) , it will f a c i l i t a t e o u r 
considera* iun of the i i rs t . 
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AM to a plea to the jurisdiction. Th. can be •»!' no avail, unless imt nnly 
the fact, at the proper time of pleading, be Limw u to the defendant, l»u. that 
he has di-intcri sh <i prouf *,{' it. 'I'hi •, in a thousand iiistanei -. would be 
impossible; and in no instance, ean la ( \pcct td . To insist < n this, iherc-
forc, as the only method, w ouhl leave t he constitution and the law, in almost 
every instance, open to certain evasion. It, consequently, cannot he admit-
ted, that this is the only method of redress. 
Wi th regard to a hill in equity. I will not say, equity onejit not to 
interpose a remedy in any case. I'.nl it seems most proper, that a court of 
law should support its own jurisdiction, on its own principles, and it proof 
can be obtained, 1 conceive it is necessarily incident to every court, to take 
care that its jurisdiction he not encroached upon, or, in other words, that 
the court be not made, either voluntarily or involuntarily (if it can prevent 
it), an usurper of jurisdiction not belonging to it. In this ease, the aid of 
equity may he useful (as it has been on the present occasion), in compelling 
a discovery ; hut there, I think, its interference ought to stop, unless 
the power% of the law-court over the action has entirely ceased; as, for 
instance, after a judgment, in which case (but in which, perhaps, alone), 
equity might properly grant an injunction, to prevent a party availing him-
self of his own fraud. 
*M7I * 1 , R ' °»lv remaining remedy suggc sted (or w hieh occurs to me), 
\ i n the present stage of the proceeding, is that now under considera-
tion ; and of course, this must be adopted, if an interference hy the court 
in the present stage of the cause is proper. I t is, however, objected, that 
the court ought not to interfere, at present, but permit the case to go before 
the jury, who -may find for the defendants, if they believe the facts sug-
gested, and apply the law accordingly. If this case had, indeed, gone before 
the jury, I should have had no diliiculfy in telling them, that admit t ing the 
truth of the facts as stated, the lessor of the plaintilf had, in my opinion, no 
title ; and if the jury had found accordingly, redress (though late) could bo 
obtained. Jiut, at present, I do not think myself at liberty to submit the 
case to the jury, for the following reasons. 
1. The court is the proper guardian of its own jurisdiction. I t is alone 
responsible for it, and must, therefore, take can? that it neither abandons a 
jurisdiction rightfully belonging to it, nor usurps that which does not. 
2. Admitt ing that a jJea to tin* jurisdiction is not the only remedy, for 
the reasons I have given, upon complaint made of any fraud on the jurisdic-
tion having been practised, if the eomplaiiH is supported on good grounds, 
it is just, that an immediate inquiry should be made into it, in order that if 
any injury to a party has been hitherto unavoidably sustained, by any such 
fraud, it may be put a stop to, as soon as possible. To compel a party, in 
such a case, to stay in court, until a jury shall be summoned and convened, 
to try a general issue, would be a voluntary exercise of jurisdiction, after 
the court entertained reason to doubt , at least, whether they had any. 
U. To sw ear a jury is an exercise of jurisdiction. W i t h what propriety 
can I order that, after being fully convinced from evidence, admitted to be 
competent, that the court hath no jurisdiction at all ? 
4. Suppose, the jury in this case should find for the plaintiff, when the 
court was thoroughly convinced it had no jurisdiction of the cause? Can 
the court give judgment for the plaintiff in sirjl a case ? Surely not. If, 
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therefore, a verdict to that effect, could produce no good, why should a ver-
di.-t be required of them ? Jlccause this would not be an ordinarv ease con-
cerning a new t r i a l ; in which case, after two or three verdicts the same 
way, a c >urt might be compelled to stop and proceed no further. J hit if 
thci. Were a hundred verdicts in a case, in their opinion, not within their 
jurisdiction, they could not. give judgment, without voluutarilv usurping a 
power not belonging t,, them. 
f». In this case, there is no occasion for a jury to try the facts, because 
the facts are not denied, ami the court surely will *not call it jurv to
 # 
decide a question of law, and a question which, as 1 have just ' 'M 'S 
observed, they could not decide finally. 3laxli<-Id's allegations in this ease, 
arc; either a direct confession, or as to some points (if the c.\pres>ioii is 
proper) a nil (licit. In neither case, is a jury wanting : a complete denial 
can alone entitle a parly to have facts tried by a jurv. There is no denial 
in this case, but of the merits, upon which a jury can be sworn ; which cer-
tainly would be premature when facts had already been confessed sullicient 
to oust the jurisdiction. Had he positively denied, indeed, the allegations 
of the bill in equity, the jury must have been sworn ; for as a judi^e, 1 cer-
tainly could not, in any shape, determine on an issue of fact. Jtut as he has 
not thought proper to deny them, but, in my opinion, substantially confessed 
everything to show that the court had no jurisdiction of the cause ; I con-
sider myself bound to order these ejectments to be dismissed, and do accord-
ingly order them to be dismissed, with costs.(f/) 
Here, one of the counsel interfered, and asked the judge whether ho 
would order costs, in a case where he declared ilia court had no jurisdiction. 
Ti$b J U P C K answered.—That that circumstance did not occur to him ; he 
acknowledged he had committed a mistake in that part of the order. iJut 
if it was in his power, he would order double costs.(A) 
</M Mr. William Tilghmnn, our of the counsel h>r the defendants, quoted a case iu 
SaviH's Ileports, p. 12, which Jiid-ro larmar. thought much in point, and meant to have 
declared so, in delivering his opinion, but inadvertently omitted it. See Worlay v. 
Harrison, Dyer LMi» ; 2 Inst. 21T,; 21 Viner o.'Jo, r,V,i\ tit. Vaeat. 
(I>) In the case of IJrowne's Lessee r. Arbunkle, in the circuit court, at October 
term ISIM; (1 W. ('. C 181), it appeared, upon hill and answer on the equilv side of tho 
court, that the lessor of the plaintill'was a citizen of the state of New Voile, and the de-
fendant was a citizen of Pennsylvania; (hat the former was a member of the popula-
tion company, who had pun based extensive tracts of land, on the north-western boundary 
of Pennsylvania; that the land so purchased was held by trustees (all citizens of Pcnn-
Rylvania), for the use of the company ; that the trustees had conveyed to the lessor of 
the plaintitr his portion of the land (in< hiding the promises mentioned in the declara-
tion), in severalty ; and that the present ejectment was founded upon thai conveyance. 
The defendant, upon these facts, and upon the authority of Maxwell's Lessee r. 
Levy, and Hurst r. Hurst, moved to strike fiom the record this ejectment, ami others 
in the same predicament. JJut the motion was overruled by the court: and this dis-
tinction taken: 
"WASHINGTON, Justice.—In the cases cited, the deeds were executed, with a collusive 
intention, to e.ivc a jurisdiction to the court, which the court could not possess with-
out them. The objection proceeded on. two grounds: 1st. On the equity of the stat-
ute provision, which declares, that a suit shall not be maintained in a fedcraJ court, by 
tho assignor of a promissory note, or other rhmc in action (with the single exception of 
foreign bills of exchange), unless it could have been brought there, by the original 
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218 O C T O B E R T E R M , 1910. 
Opinion of the Court . 219 U. S. 
question (assuming it (o he one demanding judicial exami-
nation) whether a particular case falls within the prohibi-
tion is for the determination of the court to which has 
been confided jurisdiction over the class of offenses to 
which the statute relates. 
As said by Chief Justice Marshall in Ex parte Wat kins, 
3 Pet. 193, on p. 203: " T h e judgment of such a tribunal 
has all the obligation which the judgment of any tribunal 
can have. To determine whether the offence charged in 
the indictment be legally punishable or not, is among 
the most unquestionable of its powers and duties. The 
decision of this question is the exercise of jurisdiction, 
whether the judgment be for or against the prisoner. 
The judgment is equally binding in the one case and in 
the other; and must remain in full force unless reversed 
regularly by a superior court capable of reversing it." 
And in Ex parte Parks, 93 U. S. 18, on page 20, the court 
said: "Whether an act charged in an indictment is or is 
not a crime by the law which the court administers (in 
this case the statute law of the United States), is a ques-
tion which has to be met at almost every stage of crimi-
nal proceedings; on motions to quash the indictment, on 
demurrers, on motions to arrest judgment, etc. The 
court may err, but it has jurisdiction of the question." 
In hearing this application, this court does not sit to 
review the correctness of the conclusion of the Police 
Court as to the violatiun of the statute by the petitioner, 
or of the decision of the Court of Appeals of the District 
as to the sufficiency of the information tiled against him. 
The question here is not one of guilt or innocence, but 
simply whether the court below had jurisdiction to try 
the issues. And as we find that the statute conferred that 
jurisdiction the application for a writ of habeas corpus 
must be denied. 
Rule discharged and petition dismissed. 
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Prima facie evidence is sufficient to outweigh the presumption of in-
nocence, and, if not met by opposing evidence, to support a verdict. 
Kelly v. Jackson, 0 I'et. ftV2. 
The validity of u s tatute tha t authorizes a jury to convict on piiitia 
facie evidence must be judged by the fact tha t the jury may con-
vict even if it is not made the duty of the jury to do so. 
Although a state s ta tu te in terms be to punish fraud, if its natural 
and inevitable purpose is to punish for crime for failing to perform 
contracts of labor, thus compelling such performance, it violates 
the Thirteenth Amendment and is unconstitutional. 
A constitutional prohibition cannot be transgressed indirectly by 
d e a l i n g u Matutury jircsumption any more than by direct, enact-
ment ; ajid a State cannot compel involuntary servitude in carrying 
mit contracts of personal service by crenting a presumption that the 
person committing the breach is guilty of intent to defraud merely 
because he fails to perform the contract. 
While States may, without denying due process of law, enact tha t proof 
of one fact shall be prima facie evidence of the main fact in issue, 
the inference must not be purely arbi t rary; there must be rational 
relation between the two facts, and the accused must have proper 
opportunity to submit all the facts bearing on the issue. 
While its immediate concern W M African slavery, the Thirteenth 
Amendment was a charter of universal civil freedom for all persons 
of whatever ruv(\ color, or eatate, under the flag. 
The words " involuntary se rv i tude" have a larger meaning than 
slavery, and the Thirteenth Amendment prohibited all control by 
coercion of the personal service of one man for the benefit of another. 
While the Thirteenth Amendment is self-executing, Congress hits power 
to secure its complete enforcement by appropriate legislation and 
the peonage act of March 2, 1KG7, and §§ l'.MH) and 5520, Hev. Stat , 
are valid exercises of this authority. Chjatt v. United States, l'J7 
U . S . LMI7. 
A peon is one who is compelled to work for his creditor until his debt 
220 U C T O H E H T F R M , 1910. 
.\'KU»iKnf for thp United State*. 219 U. 8. 
is paid, and tIK* fftet that ho contracted to perform the lafxir which 
is sought to ho «••mpt'lli•>{ iUn:< imt withdraw tlitr at tempted enforce-
ment from the otidenui.i t inn <>f tin' peonage acts. 
The Federal anti-pconngc acts me necessarily \ iolated hy any stale, 
legislation which .seeks to ronipel service or labor by making it a 
crime to fail or n fuse to perfoiiu it. 
Although this comt may not impute to a State an actual motive to 
oppress by a s ta tu te which that State enacts, it must coimider the 
natural operation of such s tatute and strike it down if it becomes an 
instrument of coercion forbidden by the Federal Constitution. 
Section 4730 of the ('ode of Alabama as amended in 1007, in so far 
as it makes the refusal or failure to perform labor contracted for 
without refunding the money or paying for property received prima 
facie evidence of the commission of the crime defined by such sec-
tion, and when read in connection with the rule of evidence of tha t 
State, that the accused cannot testify in regard to uncoinmunicated 
motives, is unconstitutional as in conflict with the Thirteenth 
Amendment and of the legislation authorized by it and enacted by 
Congress. 
(juLtrc, and not necessary now to decide, whether such section ip, under 
the Fourteenth Amendment, an unconstitutional deprivation of 
property without due process of law or denial of equal protection of 
the laws. 
101 Alabama, 78, reversed. 
T H E facts, which involve the constitutionality of § 4730 
of the Code of Alabama as construed by the courts of 
that State and the validity of a conviction thereunder, 
are slated in tin* opinion. 
Mr. Fred S. Ball, Mr. Edward S. Walts and Mr. Dan-
id IF. Tnnj for plaintilT in error, submitted. 
Mr. Assistant Attorney deneral Ilarr, with whom The 
Attorney iieneral was on the brief, by leave of the court, 
on behalf of the United Slates as amicus curiw: 
The judgment, and the statute upon which it is based, 
conflict with the Thirteenth Amendment and §§ 19U0, 
5520, Hev. Stat. See Ctyatl v. United States, 197 U. S. 
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207, 210, which settled the quest ion. left in doubt by 
Robertson v. BaLhein, 105 U. S. 275, 280. A Mate penal 
statute will be construed by this court as though a rule 
of evidence announced by the highest court of the State 
as being applicable thereto was incorporated therein. 
Fremiti, Police Power, § 448. 
The act, as amended, is the result of efforts to enforce 
labor contracts. See act of March 1. 1901, declared un-
constitutional by the Supreme Court of Alabama, Toney 
v. Tiie State, 141 Alabama, 120; and by the Fed era J court, 
Peonage Cases, 123 Fed. Rep. 071, 091. 
That act failing, resort was had to the statute here in 
question. Hut fust the statute, found ineffective under 
Ex parte Riley, 94 Alabama, 82, upon the subject of in-
tent, was amended by adding the prima facie clause. 
Bailey v. The State, 158 Alabama, 18, 24. 
The statute was further amended by the act of Au-
gust 15, 1907 (("ten. Act, Ala., 1907, p. 630), so as to cover 
expressly tenants of land, and by changing the penalty so 
as to make it peculiarly applicable to contracts with agri-
cultural laborers. For history of this legislation and Ow 
position of the Supreme Court of Alabama in regard 
thereto, see Bailey v. Stale, 158 Alabama, 18, 22; Banks 
v. State, 121 (leorgia, 15; State v. Thomas, 144 Alabama, 
77; Vnnns Case, 150 Alabama, 00. 
Even if the legislature can punish fraudulent practices 
in obtaining property by falsi* pretenses under contract 
for the performance of an act or .service, such object is 
clearly distinguishable from one punishing a men? breach 
of contract. Freeman v. United States, 217 U. S. 539. In 
whatever language a statute may be framed, its purpose 
must be determined hy it* natural :ui<l reasonable viJcct. 
Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 F. S. 208. 
In Florida and Mississippi, similar statutes have been 
declared void under the Thirteenth Amendment by 
United States judges in charges to grand juries; and see 
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The Thirteenth Amendment provides: 
"SECTION 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, 
except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall 
have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United 
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. 
"SECTION 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this 
article by appropriate legislation." 
Pursuant to the authority thus conferred, Congress 
passed the act of March 2, 1807, c. 187, 14 Stat. 51b\ the 
provisions of which are now found in §§ 1990 and 5520 of 
the Revised Statutes, as follows: 
" S E C . 1990. The holding of any person to service or 
labor under the system known as peonage is abolished and 
forever prohibited in the Territory of New Mexico, or in 
any other Territory or State of the United States; and all 
acts, laws, resolutions, orders, regulations, or usages of the 
Territory of New Mexico, or of any other Territory or 
State, which have heretofore established, maintained, or 
enforced, or by virtue of which any attempt shall hereafter 
be made to establish, maintain, or enforce, directly or in-
directly, the voluntary or involuntary service or labor of 
any persons as peons, in liquidation of any debt or obliga-
tion, or otherwise, are declared null and void." 
" S E C . 5520. Every person who holds, arrests, returns, 
or causes to be held, arrested, or returned, or in any man-
ner aids in the arrest or return of any person to a condi-
tion of peonage, shall be punished by a line of not less than 
one thousand nor more than five thousand dollars, or by 
Imprisonment not less than one year nor more than five 
years, or by both." 
The language* of the Thirteenth Amendment was not 
new. It reproduced the historic words of the ordinance 
of 1787 for the government of the Northwest Territory 
and gave them unrestricted application within the United 
States and all places subject to their jurisdiction. While 
the immediate concern was with African slavery, the 
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Amendment was not limited to that. I t was a charter of 
universal civil freedom for all persons, of whatever race, 
c*>lor or (^tate, under the Hag. 
The words involuntary servitude have a "larger mean-
ing than slavery.'' " I t was very well understood that in 
the form of apprenticeship for long terms, as it had been 
practiced in the West India Islands, on the abolition of 
slavery by the Knglish government, or by reducing the 
slaves to the condition of serfs attached to the plantation, 
the purpose of the article might have been evaded, if only 
the word slavery had been used." Slaughter IIou.sc Cases, 
10 Wall. p. (39. The plain intention was to abolish slavery 
of whatever name and form and all its badges and inci-
dents; to render impossible any state of bondage; to make 
labor free, by prohibiting that control by which the per-
sonal service of one man is disposed of or coerced for an-
other's benefit which is the essence of involuntary servitude. 
While the Amendment was M*lf-e\ucuting, bo fur as iU 
terms wen? applicable to any existing condition, Congress 
was authorized to secure its complete enforcement by ap-
propriate legislation. As was said in the Civil Rights cases: 
" B y its own unaided force and effect it abolished slavery, 
and established universal freedom. Still, legislation may 
be necessary and proper to meet all the various cases and 
circumstances to be affected by it, and to prescribe proper 
modes of redress for its violation in letter or spirit. And 
such legislation may be primary and direct in its char-
acter; for the Amendment is not a mere prohibition of 
stale laws establishing or upholding slavery, but an abso-
lute declaration that slavery or involuntary servitude shall 
not exist in any part of the United States." 109 U. S. 20. 
The act of March 2, 1SG7 (Hew Stat., §§ 1990, 5520, 
supra), was a valid exercise of this express authority. 
Clyatt v. United States, 197 U. S. 207. It declared that all 
laws of tiny State, by virtue of which any attempt should ' 
be made " to establish, maintain, or enforce, directly or 
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indirectly, the voluntary or involuntary service or labor 
of any persons as peons, in liquidation of any debt or obli-
gation, or otherwise,'' should be null and void. 
Peonage is a term descriptive of a condition which has 
existed in Spanish America, and especially in Mexico. The 
essence of the thing is compulsmy service in payment of a 
debt. A peon is one who is compelled to work for his 
creditor until his debt is paid. And in this explicit and 
comprehensive enactment, Congress was not concerned 
with mere names or manner of description, or with a par-
ticular place or section of the country. It was concerned 
with a fact, wherever it might exist; with a condition, 
however named and wherever it might be established, 
maintained or enforced. 
The fact that tlie debtor contracted to perform the labor 
which is sought to be compelled does not withdraw the 
attempted enforcement from the condemnation of the 
statute. The full intent of the constitutional provision 
could be defeated with obvious facility if, through the 
guise of contracts under which advances had been made, 
debtors could be held to compulsory service. It is the 
compulsion of the service that the statute inhibits, for 
when that occurs the condition of servitude is created, 
which would be not less involuntary because of the original 
agreement to work out the indebtedness. The contract 
exposes the debtor to liability for the loss due to the 
breach, but not to enforced labor. This has been so 
clearly stated by this court in the case of' Clyntt, supra, 
that discussion is unnecessary. The court there said: 
"The constitutionality.and scope of sections 1990 and 
5526 present the first questions for our consideration. 
They prohibit peonage. What is peonage? It may be de-
fined as a status or condition of compulsory service, based 
upon the indebtedness of the peon to the master. The 
basal fact is indebtedness. As said by Judge Benedict, 
delivering the opinion in Jaremillo v. Romero, 1 N. Mex. 
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190, 191: 'One fact existed universally: all were indebted 
to their masters. This was the cord by which they seemed 
bound to their masters' service.1 Upon this is based a 
condition of compulsory service. Peonage is sometimes 
classified as voluntary or involuntary, but this implies 
simply a difference in the mode of origin, but none in the 
character of the servitude. The one exists where the 
debtor voluntarily contracts to enter tin; service of his 
creditor. The other is forced upon the debtor by some 
provision of law. Hut peonage, however created, is com-
p'llsory service, involuntary servitude. The peon can re-
lease himself therefrom, it is true, by the payment of the 
debt, but otherwise the service is enforced. A clear dis-
tinction exists between peonage and the voluntary per-
formance of labor or rendering of services in payment of a 
debt, in the latter case the debtor, though contracting to 
pay his indebtedness by labor or service, and subject like 
any other contractor to an action for damages for breach 
of tTTat contract, can elect at any time to break it^  and no 
law or force compels performance or a continuance ot the 
service. We need not stop to consider any possible limits 
or exceptional cases, such as the service of a sailor, Robcrl-
son v. Baldwin, loo U. S. 275, or the obligations of a child 
to its parents, or of an apprentice to his master, or the 
power of the legislature to make unlawful and punish 
criminally an abandonment by an employe of his post of 
labor in any extreme cases. That which is contemplated 
by the statute is compulsory service to secure the payment 
of a debt." 197 U. S. pp. 215,210. 
The act of Congress, nullifying all state laws by which 
it should be attempted to enforce the "service or labor of 
any persons as peons, in liquidation of any debt or obliga-
tion, or otherwise," necessarily embraces all legislation 
which seeks to compel the service or labor by making it a 
crime to refuse or fail to perform it. Such laws would 
furnish the readiest means of compulsion. The Thirteenth 
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Amendment prohibits involuntary servitude except as 
punishment for crime. Hut the exception, allowing full 
latitude for the enforcement of penal laws, does not de-
stroy the prohibition It does not permit slavery or 
involuntary servitude to be established or maintained 
through the operation of the criminal law by making it a 
crime to refuse to submit to the one or to render the service 
which would constitute the other. The State may impose 
involuntary servitude as a punishment for crime, but it 
may not colnpcl one man to labor for another in payment 
of a debt, by punishing him as a criminal if he does not 
perforin the service or pay the debt. 
If the statute in-this ease had authorized the employing 
company to seize the.debtor and hold him to the service 
until he paid the fifteen dollars, or had furnished the 
equivalent in labor, its invalidity would not be questioned. 
I t would be equally clear that the State could not au-
thorize its constabulary to prevent the servant from escap-
ing and to force him to work out his debt. Hut the State 
could not avail itself of the sanction of the criminal law 
to supply the compulsion any more than it could use or 
authorize the use of physical force. tl In contemplation of 
the law the compulsion to such service by the fear of 
punishment under a criminal statute is more powerful 
than any guard which the employer could station." Ex 
parte Hoilman (S. Car.), 00 S. K. Rep. 21. 
What the State may not do directly it may not do in-
directly. If it cannot punish the servant as a criminal for 
the mere failure or refusal to serve without paying his 
debt, it is not permitted to accomplish the same result by 
creating a statutory presumption which upon proof of no 
other fact exposes him to conviction and punishment. 
Without imputing any actual motive to oppress, we must 
consider the natural operation of the statute here in ques-
tion (Henderson v. Mayor, 92 U. S. p. 208), and it is appar-
ent that it furnishes a convenient instrument for the coer-
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cion which the Constitution and the act of Congress forbid; 
an instrument of compulsion peculiarly effective as against 
the poor and the ignorant, its most likely victims. There 
is uo more important concern than to safeguard the free-
dom of labor upon which alone can enduring prosperity 
he based. The provisions designed 1o secure it would soon 
become a barren form if it were possible to establish a 
statutory presumption of this sort and to hold over the 
heads of laborers the threat of punishment for crime, un-
der the name of fraud but merely upon evidence of failure 
to work out their debts. The act of Congress deprives of 
effect all legislative measures of any State through which 
directly or indirectly the prohibited thing, to wit, com-
pulsory service to secure the payment of a debt may be 
established or maintained; and we conclude, that §4730, 
as amended, of the (\>de of Alabama, in so far as it makes 
the refusal or failure to perform the act or service, without 
refunding the money "or paying for the property received, 
prima Jacie evidence of the commission of the crime which 
the section defines, is in conflict with the Thirteenth 
Amendment and the legislation authorized by that Amend-
ment, and is therefore invalid. 
In this view it is unnecessary to consider the conten-
tions which have been made under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. As the case was given to the jury under instruc-
tions which authorized a verdict in accordance with the 
statutory presumption, and the opposing instructions re-
quested by the accused were refused, the judgment must 
be reversed. 
I\rrcrs<<l and cause remanded for further proceedings not 
inconsistent with this opinion. 
Mu. JusTiCK IIOLMKS, with whom concurred Mil. Jus -
TICI-: liUiiroN, dissenting. 
\Vi: all agree that this ease is to be considered and de-
cidvd in the sail." way as if it aro;;;.' in Idaho or New York,.-
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3 THE COURT: Let's go to the No. 17 case on the 
4 calendar, which is the case of State of Utah vs. Boaz, 
5 case No. 921900696. This matter is on the calendar this 
6 afternoon for a pretrial conference. This matter is 
7 scheduled to start next week. There are a number of 
8 motions pending at this time and I guess I would first 
9 like to go to the State's Motion in Limine and ask Mr. 
10 Uday or Mr. Anderson if you have had an opportunity to 
11 review the State's Motion in Limine? 
12 MR. ANDERSON: Your Honor, I have reviewed it 
13 briefly. 
14 THE COURT: Do you have an opposition to the 
15 motion? 
16 MR. ANDERSON: What we would propose, Your 
17 Honor, we are kind of combining my Motion in Limine as 
18 well. After talking with Ms. Barlow, we believe that 
19 there are stipulations regarding probably 90 percent of 
20 the evidence and motions that we could come up with and 
21 we are proposing meetings Wednesday morning among 
22 ourselves and reserved just the very minor issues we 
23 couldn't resolve right before the preliminary period 
24 right before trial because I think we can dispose of most 
25 of those issues when we sit down and go back and forth. 
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1 We are not that far off right now. 
2 THE COULT: Ms. Barlow? 
3 MS. BARLOW: That is correct, Your Honor. We 
4 discussed that among ourselves. 
5 THE COURT: So you have no objection with that 
6 process then? 
7 MS. BARLOW: No. There were some concerns 
8 about some of the stipulations involved in bringing 
9 additional witnesses out of state, but I think we will be 
10 able to resolve those in plenty of time that we would or 
11 would not have to bring them in. 
12 THE COURT: I will wait to hear from both sides 
13 then as to whether or not there are any issues that 
14 remain to be resolved. 
15 I would imagine that leaves then some motions 
16 filed by Mr. Boaz. They appear to have been filed pro 
17 se. Is that a fair statement, Mr. Anderson? 
18 MR. BOAZ: Your Honor, they were — 
19 THE COURT: Just a second, Mr. Boaz. I am 
20 addressing either Mr. Uday or Mr. Anderson at this time. 
21 Mr. Anderson or Mr. Uday, I didn't see either of your 
22 signatures on those motions. Let me say to you the 
23 motions were fairly thick, so I can't say I got through 
24 every word obviously, but I definitely did not see either 
25 of your signatures on those motions. That is why I made 
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1 that comment about it being pro se. Ordinarily in this 
2 jurisdiction when a lawyer files a motion, you sign it 
3 and the import of signing the motion, obviously, is that 
4 you come within, I guess, Rule 11 sanctions when you file 
5 a motion with the court if the motion is not meritorious. 
6 MR, UDAY: Your Honor, if I could dust clarify 
7 for the record Mr. Boaz position in this matter. You are 
8 correct in assuming and noting that Mr. Anderson nor I 
9 signed those motions. Mr. Boaz would point out, however, 
10 that you are incorrect in assuming that it was a pro se 
11 motion. What he would like this Court to understand is 
12 that Mr. Anderson and I are co-counsel with Mr. Boaz. 
13 That he is functioning in part as his own attorney. 
14 Specifically on this issue that he has filed in those 
15 motions, he has a great concern and belief this Court 
16 lacks proper jurisdiction to try him and in support of 
17 that motion which he, I suppose, presented at least 
18 initially with Judge Sawaya, he has now consistent with 
19 the appellate considerations filed that motion in writing 
20 to review and to have this Court, this Judge, review 
21 those allegations and make a ruling prior to the trial we 
22 have scheduled next week. 
23 THE COURT: Are you of the opinion Judge Sawaya 
24 previously ruled on these motions? 
25 MR. UDAY: Yes, he previously denied the 
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1 motion. There is no question about that. However, it is 
2 noteworthy that there was not a hearing held which I 
3 think is fairly important and also there was not an 
4 opportunity for Mr. Boaz to file a written motion. So in 
5 order for him to both preserve that issue for appeal, and 
6 now that there is a new Judge on the matter, to have it 
7 looked at now prior to ending up in a trial and on 
8 appeal, he has filed a written motion and is requesting 
9 as part of that motion he have argument on that case. 
10 He also would like it specified that his 
11 appearance here today is by special appearance, not 
12 general and that his other appearance before this Court 
13 when Judge Sawaya was presiding, is not in any way to be 
14 construed of conceding to jurisdiction by this Court. I 
15 suppose that that is all the clarification we need. 
16 THE COURT: Was Judge Sawaya's ruling ever 
17 reduced to an order? 
18 MR. UDAY: No, there were no Conclusions of Law 
19 or Findings of Fact. I think that that is from both of 
20 our positions, something that this Court will probably 
21 want to do to avoid any reassurance of this hearing at 
22 some future day, to give this motion the consideration 
23 that is intended by Mr. Boaz and give him an opportunity 
24 to argue his position. 
25 THE COURT: This is an unrelated issue, so 
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1 let's not spend a great deal of time with this, but have 
2 you had conversations amongst the three of you as to how 
3 you are going to divide your duties since we are talking 
4 about a co-counsel situation? 
5 MR. UDAY: Yes, pretty much. As I understand 
6 the division of that labor, and again, Mr. Boaz, correct 
7 me if I am wrong, but what we understood is that he is 
8 going to be in charge of lead, guide, in control of the 
9 motion that he has filed with the Court. And he will 
10 leave the trial and the proceedings to Mr. Anderson and I 
11 in terms of cross examination and calling witnesses and 
12 doing those other things; is that correct? 
13 MR. BOAZ: (Nods head affirmatively), yes. 
14 MR. UDAY: He nods his assent, Your Honor. 
15 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Uday. Let me 
16 turn to the state and ask whether or not you have 
17 received copies of these motions? One thing I didn't 
18 note, and again I went through these fairly briskly, I 
19 did not note any Certificate of Mailing or Delivery, but 
20 maybe I missed it. Ms. Barlow. 
21 MS. BARLOW: We did receive copies, Your Honor. 
22 THE COURT: Okay. Is the state prepared to 
23 respond to those motions at this time? 
24 MS. BARLOW: I have not read them really 
25 carefully. I am prepared to respond to the jurisdiction 
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1 argument at this time, or we could do that at a later 
2 date. 
3 THE COURT: Well, let's see if we can get these 
4 issues resolved and what I will do is give both of you an 
5 opportunity to make your oral argument. I will give both 
6 of you ten minutes. 
7 Mr. Boaz, why don't you step forward and make 
8 your argument at this time, if you wish to do so, sir. 
9 There is one point I would like to make Mr. Boaz, before 
10 you begin. You do wish to make your own oral argument on 
11 this motion; is that correct? 
12 MR. BOAZ: I am not prepared right now to fully 
13 argue it. I wasn't expecting to do it this afternoon, 
14 but I can make a brief statement. I would like to leave 
15 the option open for a full presentation. 
16 THE COURT: Let me just say this to you. My 
17 view on this situation right now is that this is the only 
18 opportunity you are going to get to make an oral argument 
19 to me. I am going to read what you filed in more detail. 
20 Like I said, I have had a preliminary examination of what 
21 you filed but I want to give you the brief opportunity to 
22 supplement what you filed in writing through oral 
23 argument. The only concern I have, Mr. Boaz and Mr. Uday 
24 and Mr. Anderson, is that it is your desire, in fact, Mr. 
25 Boaz, to make this oral argument to me instead of having 
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1 Mr. Uday or Mr. Anderson make the oral argument; is that 
2 correct? 
3 MR. BOAZ: Yes, sir, that is correct. 
4 THE COURT: And my concern was, Mr. Boaz, since 
5 you are the defendant in this particular case and taking 
6 into consideration your constitutional protections of not 
7 being forced to make a statement, not being forced to 
8 take the witness stand to testify at your trial, there is 
9 always the potential risk that something you may say 
10 during the course of this oral argument might be 
11 incriminating and could come back to be used against you 
12 during the course of the trial. Do you understand that? 
13 MR. BOAZ: Yes, sir, I understand that. 
14 THE COURT: And with that information, it is 
15 still your desire to make your own oral argument here? 
16 MR. BOAZ: Yes, sir. 
17 THE COURT: Okay, you may go forward. 
18 MR. BOAZ: I have a correction. There was a 
19 memorandum at law and an addendum to the memorandum, and 
20 it had some errors. I have re-done them. Here is the 
21 Court's copy and here is a copy for the state. 
22 THE COURT: You may give a copy to Ms. Barlow 
23 and to my clerk. 
24 MR. BOAZ: I would make one correction to what 
25 Mr. Uday said. I am not here acting as my own attorney. 
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1 I am here in propria persona, and the arguments regarding 
2 jurisdiction really are in three areas. 
3 The first is because of my status as a 
4 sovereign, natural born state citizen of the Texas 
5 Republic, and not a United States citizen, the court of 
6 jurisdiction, the proper court of jurisdiction in this 
7 matter, according to the U.S. Constitution is the U.S. 
8 Supreme Court. 
9 Secondly, if this court has jurisdiction, it 
10 leaves me without remedy because as a sovereign citizen I 
11 cannot be compelled to accept a benefit from the 
12 government that I do not desire; and should I be damaged 
13 in this action, I am without remedy to be able to collect 
14 damages since the government has taken constitutional 
15 money out of circulation and I do not wish to accept the 
16 benefit of using Federal Reserve Notes to collect the 
17 damage should I be awarded one because I do not wish to 
18 get involved in the discharging of debts rather than 
19 paying them. 
20 And thirdly, the Court lacks jurisdiction 
21 because of its lack of ability to enforce its judgments. 
22 According to your Utah code, you can fine me up to 
23 $10,000 per count in the event of a conviction. Well, I 
24 am unable to pay that since there is no constitutional 
25 money in circulation and, once again, I cannot be 
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1 compelled to use Federal Reserve Notes to discharge a 
2 debt with limited liability instead of paying a debt. 
3 And that really is what the three main points are, the 
4 three points are, and it all turns on my status. 
5 Now, I have filed an affidavit with the Court 
6 of status and another affidavit of recession which is on 
7 record in Terrent County, Texas, and it is the state's 
8 position that some contracts between me and the federal 
9 government or any other level of government exists, I 
10 demand it be brought in the courtroom, entered into 
11 evidence so I can examine it and rebut it. 
12 THE COURT: Any other basis? 
13 MR. BOAZ: No, sir. 
14 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Boaz. Let's give 
15 Ms. Barlow a chance to respond. 
16 MR. BARLOW: Thank you, Your Honor. It is my 
17 understanding the argument is that this Court does not 
18 have jurisdiction over the person of Mr. Boaz. 
19 THE COURT: And do me a favor, Ms. Barlow, pull 
20 that microphone toward you I can see Mr. Boaz. I'm 
21 straining to hear you. 
22 MS. BARLOW: Happy to do that, Your Honor. I 
23 turn to the Constitution of the State of Utah which gives 
24 jurisdiction in Article 8 Section 1, MThe judicial power 
25 of the state shall be vested in the Supreme Court and in 
9 
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1 a trial court of general jurisdiction known as the 
2 District Court." 
3 And Section 5 of that article says, "The 
4 District Court shall have original jurisdiction in all 
5 matters except as limited by this constitution or by 
6 statute." 
7 This Court has been given original jurisdiction 
8 in criminal cases and the statute that delineates that 
9 jurisdiction is Section 78-3-4: "The District Court has 
10 original jurisdiction in all matters, civil and criminal, 
11 not excepted in the Utah Constitution and not prohibited 
12 by law." And that is the subject matter jurisdiction 
13 this Court has original jurisdiction in. 
14 Finally, in the criminal code for the State of 
15 Utah, Title 76-1-201, "A person is subject to prosecution 
16 in this state for an offense which he commits while 
17 either within or outside of the state by his own conduct 
18 or that of another for which he is legally accountable if 
19 the offense is committed either wholly or partly within 
20 the state." 
21 I would submit that Mr. Boaz by coming into 
22 this state, no matter what citizen or what republic or 
23 what country he is a citizen of, or may be a citizen of, 
24 by coming into this state and committing actions which we 
25 allege to be criminal actions, he has submitted himself 
10 
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1 to the jurisdiction of this state and the jurisdiction of 
2 this court under the laws of this state. 
3 If he were to stay in Texas, of course, and do 
4 perform his acts in Texas, and if those acts have no 
5 impact whatsoever in Utah, that none of the actions that 
6 he does in Texas were to be an element of a crime in 
7 Utah, we would not be here today. But what he has done 
8 is come into this state and has performed actions which 
9 are elements of crimes. Actually, the sell of securities 
10 of an unregistered broker and unregistered securities and 
11 in a fraudulent manner. And by coming into this state 
12 and doing that he has submitted himself to the 
13 jurisdiction of this state and this court. I think the 
14 statutes are quite clear and the constitution is quite 
15 clear on that. 
16 His sovereignty or his citizenry is immaterial. 
17 It is his actions in this state that have submitted him 
18 to the jurisdiction to this state and we would ask the 
19 Court to deny his Motion to Dismiss for lack of 
20 jurisdiction. 
21 THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Barlow. Since it is 
22 your motion, Mr. Boaz, I will give you a two-minute 
23 request for rebuttal, sir. 
24 MR. BOAZ: In my motions, Judge, I asked the 
25 state to give me written responses to each of my points. 
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1 If I understand the law correctly, the state has the 
2 burden of proving jurisdiction and has the burden of 
3 responding to each of my points, and then providing 
4 additional evidence of jurisdiction. A simply claim to 
5 jurisdiction isn't the way it is supposed to be, I also 
6 would like to have a hearing on the rebuttal after the 
7 written rebuttal is submitted to me. 
8 THE COURT: Anything else, sir? 
9 MR. BOAZ: No, sir. 
10 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Boaz. Let me just 
11 say this, as I indicated earlier, I had a brief 
12 opportunity to preliminarily review the motion filed by 
13 Mr. Boaz and I am going to have to read the motion in 
14 detail especially with the supplementation he has given 
15 to me here. 
16 Let me say at first glance that I am not going 
17 to rule on this case at first glance. But at first 
18 glance, there certainly appears that this Court has 
19 subject matter, as well as personal jurisdiction over Mr. 
20 Boaz. But before I ultimately rule on that issue, I want 
21 the opportunity to review in full the documents that Mr. 
22 Boaz has filed. And let me say that I intend to have 
23 that done by the end of the day tomorrow. 
24 Additionally, I don't anticipate conducting any 
25 other hearing or having any other oral argument on this 
12 
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1 particular point. I am going to review the written 
2 submissions, the oral argument submitted to me at this 
3 time and rule on the pending issues. 
4 I would like to shift gears for a moment and, 
5 Ms. Barlow, are these felony offenses, are they zero to 
6 three's or do we have some other hybrid? 
7 MS. BARLOW: I can't remember. 
8 THE COURT: I can double check. 
9 MR. ANDERSON: They are zero to three's from 
10 the date of filing. 
11 MS. BARLOW: I think they are zero to three. I 
12 think the law change came after. 
13 THE COURT: Are we talking about 12 zero to 
14 three's? Is that what we are dealing with; isn't that 
15 correct? 
16 MS. BARLOW: Yes. 
17 THE COURT: I would like to hear from you, Ms. 
18 Barlow, since this is a pretrial conference. What effort 
19 has the state made to resolve this case short of trial? 
20 MS. BARLOW: We were discussing out in the 
21 hallway dust before we came back in and the Court took 
22 the bench, the possibility of a resolution. The state, 
23 and I have not talked to co-counsel, Steve Nielsen, who 
24 is here a special assistant attorney general about this. 
25 The state would probably want a plea to the range of 
13 
00553 
1 conduct, including a plea to one of the fraud counts, and 
2 my understanding is that is probably not acceptable to 
3 Mr. Boaz. We have not done anything more than discuss 
4 the possibility. I am not sure that Mr. Boaz would 
5 accept anything we offered and I am not sure that we 
6 would accept anything they offered. We will be talking 
7 further about this as we talk about our stipulations. 
8 We talked just briefly in the hallway. Our 
9 understanding all along, I recognize this as just merely 
10 a week before trial, our understanding is Mr. Boaz was 
11 not wanting to plea to anything. I am not sure what 
12 negotiations took place before I got involved in the 
13 case. 
14 THE COURT: Let me just say this, I am going to 
15 express my concern and then I will say no more about 
16 this. It is not my role here today to try to apply 
17 subtle pressure or direct pressure to force either the 
18 State of Utah or Mr. Boaz into a resolution short of 
19 trial. The only thing that really concerns me, and again 
20 I am going to have to determine tomorrow whether or not I 
21 think that Mr. Boaz' motions are meritorious, but the 
22 only thing that concerns me is that the nature of the 
23 motions raised by Mr. Boaz. 
24 It has been my experience, and I don't know Mr. 
25 Boaz from the man in the moon, but it has been my 
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1 experience on these types of cases dealing with these 
2 types of issues, and when I say "these types of issues," 
3 I am going to use an overly broad generalization and 
4 paint the broad brush and call it a constitutionalist 
5 defense and just let me simply say that during my years 
6 on the bench, it has been my experience that when 
7 individuals have raised these types of defenses, albeit 
8 very sincerely, it has also been my experience that those 
9 same individuals have a difficult time sitting down and 
10 evaluating objectively the strengths and weaknesses of 
11 the respective positions of the defense, the strengths 
12 and weaknesses of the prosecution, the risk of 
13 conviction, the potential sentence at the time of 
14 sentencing, if you get that far in the process. It has 
15 just been my experience that there is difficulty in 
16 objectively evaluating the cold, hard realities of life 
17 in a criminal case. 
18 I don't know if that is the situation with Mr. 
19 Boaz or not. It is not important that I know whether it 
20 is or not, but what I do think is important and I am 
21 going to require Ms. Barlow, Mr. Uday, Mr. Boaz, and Mr. 
22 Anderson, that the four of you sit down. I am not 
23 ordering that it be done altogether, but I am going to 
24 order that you sit down and evaluate the strengths and 
25 weaknesses of your case. And try to make an objective 
15 
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1 determination of what the risks are, the risk of the 
2 state possibly ending up with an acquittal, the potential 
3 with Mr. Boaz ending with a conviction. If we are 
4 talking 12 zeros to three's, obviously we are talking 
5 about maximums. We are talking about the potential of 36 
6 years in prison. That is a very long time, I would 
7 think, for anyone and it is certainly serious enough to 
8 call for clear objective thinking and evaluation. And I 
9 encourage both sides to get that done. 
10 With that said, I am going to assume that we 
11 are going to have a trial on this matter beginning next 
12 week. Mr. Uday, Mr. Anderson, is there anything else you 
13 want to add? 
14 MR. UDAY: Your Honor, I do have one concern. 
15 THE COURT: Go ahead. 
16 MR. UDAY: Regarding procedurally how we will 
17 go forward. I appreciate the Court's comments regarding 
18 evaluation of cases and further discussion being 
19 important. We have anticipated further discussion next 
20 week to talk about what we are able to stipulate to. In 
21 the event we cannot stipulate to everything, I would 
22 suggest that maybe we meet again here Monday prior to 
23 Tuesday, or Friday if the Court could, to see what we 
24 have agreed on and what is still outstanding. 
25 THE COURT: Just keep me informed as to how you 
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1 progress and I will make every effort for evidentiary 
2 reasons to try and work even — I have no problem with 
3 that. 
4 MR. UDAY: You want to calendar something 
5 specifically in terms of the day before? 
6 THE COURT: I would rather not do that now. 
7 MR. UDAY: One other clean-up question that Mr. 
8 Boaz has introduced to me that I would want to bring to 
9 the Court's attention, is assuming we do proceed to 
10 trial, he has a desire to bring in his personal tape 
11 recorder to tape record the events so that he might 
12 review those during the evening between trial days to 
13 double check testimony. He indicates to me he has a 
14 difficult time taking notes during the pendency of 
15 discussion and actually gaining anything from the 
16 discussion that is going on at the same time. 
17 THE COURT: That is one I will have to think 
18 about and when I rule on the Motion to Dismiss, I will 
19 include in my minute entry whether or not I will allow 
20 that. 
21 MR. UDAY: The other concern I have, just by 
22 way of cleaning up the procedure here, is if the Court is 
23 going to review Mr. Boaz' motion, there may be a 
24 likelihood of questions. And again, that is another 
25 reason I think it might be beneficial for us to meet 
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again prior to the first morning of trial in the event 
that the Court has any additional questions that Mr. Boaz 
could either answer or — 
THE COURT: If I have questions, I will contact 
you in advance certainly and in enough time to allow any 
response that I might need. 
MR. UDAY: The only point of clarification I 
need, these others may not, but what time does the trial 
start? 
THE COURT: I think we might be set at 10:00, 
if I am not mistaken. I think we have a 9:00 matter on 
the calendar. (Pause) We are set at 9:00, Mr. Uday. 
MR. UDAY: On the 15th? 
THE COURT: That is correct. 
MR. UDAY: Will that be the starting time for 
every" day of trial? 
THE COURT: Every day except Friday. We do 
start at 10:00 on Tuesday because we have another matter 
starting at 9. 
MR. UDAY: On the 15th we will start at 10? 
THE COURT: Correct. 
MR. UDAY: Let me indicate to the Court why I 
am most concerned about that. I teach in the paralegal 
program at Community College. I am currently teaching an 
8:00 to 9:00 Monday, Wednesday and Friday class. If I 
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1 teach that without finding a substitute, I'll have 
2 difficulty getting here by nine. I wonder if we could 
3 even back it off to 9:15 starting time or 9:30? If that 
4 would inconvenience the Court too much, I could find 
5 somebody to substitute those days. 
6 THE COURT: Right now I am going to ask that 
7 you find a substitute. 
8 MR. UDAY: That would be all that we would 
9 have. 
10 MS. BARLOW: Now I am confused. Tuesday the 
11 15th we start at 10:00? 
12 THE COURT: Correct. 
13 MS. BARLOW: Other days except Friday, we will 
14 start at 9:00? 
15 THE COURT: Correct, except for, you never 
16 know, emergency situations happen whereby we need to 
17 start, for example, at ten on a given day. 
18 MS. BARLOW: One other question. We have our 
19 respective voir dire and jury instructions that we are 
20 ready to submit to the Court. Part of them are based on 
21 an Amended Information because at preliminary hearing two 
22 counts were dismissed. However, we don't have someone 
23 ready to swear to that Amended Information today. Should 
24 we submit all of the documents today or would you prefer 
25 someone to come in to swear to that? 
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1 THE COURT: I would definitely prefer someone 
2 to come in to swear to it. So can you do that some time 
3 during the day tomorrow? 
4 MS. BARLOW: We will send in the investigator 
5 to swear to that. We would submit the voir dire and the 
6 jury instructions at this time. 
7 THE COURT: That would be fine. Mr. Uday and 
8 Mr. Anderson, do you have your voir dire and jury 
9 instructions as well? 
10 MR. UDAY: We don't have those today. 
11 THE COURT: I did give you a date to have that 
12 done by, did I not? 
13 MR. UDAY: To be honest with the Court, I am 
14 not sure. 
15 THE COURT: How soon can you get it done? 
16 MR. UDAY: I know that Mr. Anderson has begun 
17 working on those. I talked to the paralegal. I had some 
18 question about those today. I would think we can 
19 probably have them by Thursday. 
20 THE COURT: Get it to me by Thursday. Anything 
21 else? (No response.) You are excused. 
22 MR. UDAY: Thank you, Your Honor. 
23 MS. BARLOW: Thank you, Your Honor. 
24 * * * * * 
25 
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